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I. PREFACE
This note concerns the application of the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)' to litigation in-
volving the environment, natural resources, and hazardous
substances. It has a dual purpose. First, since many environ-
mental law practitioners may have never litigated a racketeering
case, this note provides a broad overview of RICO issues. Sec-
ond, it functions as a reference source for RICO cases dealing
with environmental fact patterns,2 including "true environmen-
tal" RICO cases.
3
Private RICO actions involve a unique blend between crim-
inal and civil legal principles. From society's perspective, tradi-
tional civil and criminal enforcement mechanisms for
environmental laws may be viewed as deficient. From an indi-
vidual plaintiff's perspective, traditional civil remedies may not
offer adequate relief in an environmental action. Private RICO
actions against polluters may benefit society and give the indi-
vidual plaintiff an additional avenue for redress of injuries. This
Note discusses the need for an alternate enforcement mechanism
I Pub. L. No. 91-452, Title IX, 84 Stat. 941 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961-1968 (1984 & Supp. 1990)).
2 The cases generally fall into two categories. First, the RICO litigation may
directly concern violation of environmental laws. See, e.g., Boone v. Beacon Bldg.
Corp., 613 F. Supp. 1151 (D.C.N.J. 1985)(RICO suit by home purchaser near toxic
landfill against builders, realtors, landfill operators, and municipality for inducing the
purchase). Second, the RICO litigation may only peripherally concern the environment,
natural resources, or hazardous substances. See, e.g., Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Gleave, 540
F. Supp. 81 (D.C.N.Y. 1982)(RICO action by oil company against defendants for stealing
gasoline).
The "true environmental" cases-that is, the ones of the first type-are few in
number. The author has endeavored to incorporate all such cases to date (published and
unpublished) in this note.
I See supra note 2, for the distinction between "true environmental" RICO cases
and those which merely involve peripheral environmental issues.
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in the environmental/natural resources context, and explores
how RICO can meet that need.
II. THE NEED FOR ALTERNATE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
A. Criminal Enforcement
Most federal environmental statutes provide criminal penal-
ties for negligent, knowing, or willful violations .4 Until recently,
these criminal provisions were rarely enforced.' The "traditional
approach" has involved the use of civil and administrative en-
forcement mechanisms.6 Reasons for the lack of criminal en-
forcement include small budgets,7 lack of "staff and time",,
and high-level policy decisions to simply avoid prosecutions.9
4 See, e.g., the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act [hereinafter
cited as FIFRA], Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 975 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§136a-136w (1980 & Supp. 1990)); the Toxic Substance Control Act [hereinafter cited as
TSCA], Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-
2629 (1982 & Supp. 1990)); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act [hereinafter cited
as the Clean Water Act, or CWA], Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1986 & Supp. 1990)); the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act [hereinafter cited as RCRA], Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2796
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1983 & Supp. 1990)); and the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act [hereinafter cited
as CERCLA], Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9657 (1983 & Supp. 1990)).
Potential penalties range from moderate to relatively severe. For example, a negli-
gent violation of the Clean Water Act may result in a fine of between $2,500.00 and
$25,000.00 per day, and/or imprisonment up to one year. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1). On
the other hand, a "knowing" violation of RCRA which places a person in imminent
danger of serious bodily injury or death may result in fines up to $250,000.00 ($1,000,000.00
for corporations) and/or up to 15 years imprisonment. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e).
I Johnson, State and Local Environmental Criminal Enforcement, ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY: CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENr OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWs 31 (1990).
6 Kaye, Study Materials, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 55 (1990).
1 According to Kentucky Attorney General Fred Cowan, his staff "had investi-
gated alleged violations of environmental law in the last two years, but [he indicated
that] there had been no prosecutions because tight budgets ruled out the often-costly
trials". Lexington Herald-Leader, February 1, 1990, at B2, col. 6.
Id. (comments of Louis DeFalaise, United States Attorney for the Eastern
District of Kentucky).
I An example of a high-level policy decision to avoid prosecutions is Assistant
United States Attorney General Richard B. Stewart's letter to United States Environ-
mental Protection Administration Administrator William K. Reilly. After the Federal
Bureau of Investigation entered the Rocky Flats nuclear plant in Colorado with search
warrants to look for criminal environmental violations, Stewart wrote that the "Justice
Department would not prosecute [the United States Department of Energy or Rockwell
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One prosecutor points out that a local prosecutor often "feels
that he is busy handling 'real crimes' and that he will leave the
environmental cases to the people in the state capitol or in
Washington." 10
The statistics also support the proposition that criminal en-
forcement has been minimal. Only 25 criminal environmental
cases were prosecuted by the Justice Department during the
entire decade of the 1970's.1 One author puts this into perspec-
tive when he points out that "more significant prosecutions took
place against purveyors of booze than have taken place against
toxic waste dumpers."1 2 Furthermore, sentences actually imposed
for criminal convictions have typically been light. 3
Times, however, are changing. In 1989, the EPA referred 60
criminal cases to the Justice Department for prosecution. 14 Even
more striking than these statistics is the fact that the government
now prosecutes high-profile corporations like Exxon. 15 Organi-
zational changes also indicate a new emphasis on criminal en-
forcement. For example, the EPA has created an Office of
Criminal Enforcement, staffed with "specialized, full-time crim-
International Corp.] for violations of environmental laws while they are in the process
of bringing the plant into compliance." Rockwell Claims Innocence At Rocky Flats, 20
Env't Rep. (BNA) at 1045 (Oct. 13, 1989). Rep. Thomas Luken (D-Ohio), chairman of
the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Transportation and Hazardous
Materials, criticized officials for "abandoning the principles of criminal enforcement."
Id. Rep. Luken also said that "criminal enforcement of environmental laws is the most
effective deterrent to pollution available at DOE plants. Yet, incredibly, the Justice
Department and the DOE Inspector General are now telling us that DOE employees and
DOE's contractors ... have been let off the hook for the biggest environmental scandal
of the century." [Quote mistakenly attributed to DOE Inspector General John C.
Layton.] Id.
,o Kaye, supra note 6, at 53. John A. Kaye, a District Attorney in New Jersey,
also points out that corporate polluters "tend to be respected members of the community,
and are frequently politically active". Id. at 63. Kaye claims this is "outside of the
criminal prosecution criteria, [but] it is a notable consideration nonetheless". Id.
" F. Henry Habicht II, The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal En-
forcement: How to Remain on the Civil Side, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10478,
10479 (Dec. 1987).
A. BLOCK AND F. ScARPrI, POISONING FOR PROFIT 309 (1985).
For example, in 1983, "periods of incarceration were imposed upon only four
of the seventeen individual defendants convicted of violating federal environmental
laws." Id. at 333.
14 ELR Update, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) (Update) (Dec. 26, 1989).
"1 U.S. v. Exxon Corp., No. A90-015 CR (D. Alaska 1990). Exxon has been
indicted for two felony and three misdemeanor violations of the Clean Water Act and
other laws. See, Federal Grand Jury Indicts Exxon After Alaska Rejects Proposed Plea,
20 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1811 (March 2, 1990).
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inal investigators ... [who are] fully deputized and vested with
the law enforcement powers of a United States Marshal, armed
and authorized to execute search and arrest warrants.' ' 6 Fur-
thermore, the Department of Justice has created an Environ-
mental Crimes Unit, 7 and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
has targeted environmental crimes as a priority.' 8 Finally, man-
datory sentencing guidelines concerning environmental violations
published by the United States Sentencing Commission will now
require judges to "view environmental crimes far more seriously
than they have in the past .....-.
Environmental contamination presents serious dangers to
crops, livestock, fish, soil, and to people themselvesY' The public
now realizes these dangers, and recent polls almost unanimously
indicate the desire for strong enforcement of environmental laws,
even at great expense.21 Federal law enforcement administrators
have made great strides,2 however there are currently only slightly
more than 40 criminal investigators at the EPA. 23 Given prose-
cutors' great discretion and limited resources,2' it is clear that
federal criminal enforcement of environmental laws is only one
small part of the solution to the pollution problem.
,6 Habicht, supra note 11, at 10479. See also Enviro-cops on the Prowl For
Polluters, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 9, 1989, at 23.
17 Habicht, supra note 11, at 10479.
I Id.
19 J. Starr and T. Kelly Jr., Environmental Crimes and the Sentencing Guidelines:
The Time Has Come .... and It is Hard Time, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. 10096 (Envtl. L. Inst.)
(March 1990). The new rules "remove nearly all discretion that judges have traditionally
enjoyed at the sentencing stage. Now it is more a matter of making mathematical
computations". Id. Parole has been abolished, and sentences are determinate. The
availability of probation has been dramatically reduced. According to the authors, "most
of those who have been convicted for environmental offenses and have received only
probation would now most likely spend time behind bars under the new sentencing
rules". Id. at 10097.
2 See generally A. BLOCK & F. ScARPrrn, supra note 12 (particularly Chapter 2,
entitled "The Environmental Time Bomb"). The authors point out that contamination
of aquifers may persist for hundreds of thousands of years, and "tens of thousands of
inactive landfill sites may be taking their toll on unsuspecting [people]." Id. at 53.
21 Id. at 325.
See supra text accompanying notes 14-19.
Habicht, supra note 11, at 10479.
4 The decision to proceed criminally "is a discretionary judgment." Habicht,
supra note 11, at 10481. The author points out that although prosecutors "are motivated
by their desire first to do the right thing," that practically, they "like to win and are
less likely to proceed to indictment and expend litigation resources unless a case looks
strong .... " Id.
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B. Civil Enforcement
EPA officials acknowledge major problems with civil en-
forcement. EPA Deputy Administrator F. Henry Habicht re-
cently admitted that the agency "needs to do more than 'bean
counting' of the number of enforcement actions it takes to show
real environmental enforcement. ' 25 The Office of the Inspector
General at EPA recently released an audit which concluded that
the agency "is not vigorously enforcing its laws and regula-
tions." 6 The report pointed out that "millions of dollars in
penalties against polluters have been reduced ... in some cases
in excess of 90 percent . . .with little or no documentation to
support the reductions. ' 27 In some instances, the EPA is aware
of serious environmental violations, but policy prevents enforce-
ment actions. 28 For example, the Justice Department's "unitary
theory of the executive," prohibits the EPA from "filing law-
suits or issuing unilateral orders against its sister agencies.
' 29
Given the current state of affairs, it appears that the public can
rely upon neither criminal nor civil enforcement to protect its
environmental resources.
C. The Private Remedy
Corporate polluters view payment of civil judgments as "part
of the normal costs of doing business." 0 When a private plain-
tiff receives compensation for his or her injuries which resulted
from environmental pollution, that cost may be passed on to
other innocent members of society (consumers). Although the
plaintiff may be "made whole", society may be forced to pay
for the plaintiff's injuries, and may very well have to suffer the
Habicht Promises Management Review of EPA Enforcement Program, Seeks
Improvement, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1337 (Nov. 24, 1989). See also DOJ, EPA Blasted
for Lax Civil Enforcement During Marine Shale Criminal Investigation, 20 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 959 (Sept. 29, 1989).
26 Id.
27 'Forceless Enforcement' Found by OMB at EPA: Inspector General Cites Mil-
lions in Reduced Fines, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) at 1087-1088 (Oct. 20, 1989).
Energy Department Report Highlights Environmental, Occupational and Health
Non-Compliance at DOE's Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities, 4 Corp. Crime Rptr.
No. 6 at 7, 8 (Feb. 12, 1990).
" Id. at 8.
o Grover C. Wrenn, The Role of Environmental Consultants in Criminal Envi-
ronmental Enforcement Matters, ALI-ABA COURSE OF SrUDy: CRIMIAL ENFORCEMENT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 181, 186 (1990).
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continued environmental effects of the defendant's pollution.
Furthermore, the plaintiff may not in fact be "made whole".
Depending upon his cause of action, his recovery may be reduced
by the costs of litigation, including substantial attorney's fees.3'
In fact, it may be difficult for the plaintiff to win anything
under common law theories of liability, because "the mechan-
isms of certain forms of pollution typically arising in environ-
mental tort cases ... do not fit neatly within the traditional
categories of either trespass or nuisance." '3 2 Even when a suc-
cessful cause of action is brought under a statute allowing re-
covery of attorney's fees, the plaintiff's recovery may be limited
to particular types of damages. For example, although the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA) section 107 authorizes a private cause of action,33
the plaintiff must overcome serious hurdles before recovery.
First, many courts have held that the plaintiff must actually
incur some "response costs" (i.e., plaintiff must begin the cleanup
process) before recovery.34 Also, some courts require govern-
mental approval or participation in the private cleanup for the
plaintiff's response costs to be "consistent" with the national
contingency plan.3' Finally, courts have limited the definition of
recoverable "response costs" .36 The deficiencies in all the various
common-law and statutory causes of action are too numerous
to list here; they are beyond the scope of this note. Certain
plaintiffs, recognizing the limitations inherent in traditional causes
of action, may want to consider adding a RICO count to their
complaint.
1, See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240
(1975) (holding that the "American Rule" disallowing fees for prevailing parties applies
absent statutory authorization or other special circumstances).
12 3 S. CooKE, LAW OF HAZARDOus WAsTE § 17.01[8] (1989).
" See supra note 4; City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., see e.g., 544 F.
Supp. 1135, 1143 (E.D. Pa. 1982). CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) provides that
where a "release" or "threatened release" of a "hazardous substance" from a "facility
... causes the incurrence of response costs", then certain persons are liable for "any
other necessary cost of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national
contingency plan". Id.
' See supra note 32 at § 16.01[7][b].
Id. at § 16.0117][a].
3 See, e.g., Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269 (D.
Del. 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that economic
losses such as lost profits are unrecoverable under CERCLA). See also Piccolini v.
Simon's Wrecking, 686 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that claims for
diminution in property value and lost income were unrecoverable under CERCLA).
1990-91]
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D. The Private RICO Action
The private RICO action" may not only be desirable to the
private plaintiff (depending upon the unique circumstances of
his case and the availability of traditional remedies), but it may
also be a socially desirable goal. As previously discussed, crim-
inal enforcement of environmental laws is severely limited by
prosecutors' resources and other factors. 8 From a societal stand-
point, criminal sanctions for environmental offenses may be
preferable to traditional civil enforcement. First, effective crim-
inal sanctions deter environmental violations before they occur.3 9
Traditional civil remedies, on the other hand, may only com-
pensate for past wrongs, and they might not even fully compen-
sate injuries sustained. 40 Second, although the ultimate penalties
imposed in criminal actions may not differ much from those in
civil actions, criminal prosecutions impose a much greater stigma
than do wholly civil actions. 41 As such, the deterrence value of
17 A private cause of action is provided for "any person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of [RICO]". 18 U.S.C. § 1964.
3 See supra text accompanying notes 4-24.
See, e.g. Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws Seeks Deterrence Amid
Need for Increased Coordination, Training, Public A wareness, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA)
800 (Sept. 26, 1986).
See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
41 This view is widely, if not unanimously held by prosecutors and environmental
consultants. See, e.g., Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, supra note 39, at
802, quoting an Ohio assistant attorney general as stating that "the business community
attaches 'a strong stigma' to a criminal prosecution." The prosecutor said, "We have
had people in corporations charged with an environmental crime who say that they
would pay almost any civil penalty if we dropped the criminal case." Id. An EPA
official agreed: 'For a company to find itself under prosecution for environmental
crimes, it's a much greater stigma' than a civil enforcement action." Id.; see also D.
Riesel, Criminal Prosecution and Defense of Environmental Wrongs, 15 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10065. The author, a former Assistant United States Attorney, states,
"There can be little doubt in any experienced practitioner's mind that, as compared to
the possibility of civil fines or injunctions, the threat of criminal punishment most
quickly seizes the attention of members of the regulated community. [AIll responsible
members of the community wish to eschew the stigma of criminal conduct at almost all
costs." Id. at 10067; see also Grover C. Wrenn, The Role of Environmental Consultants
in Criminal Environmental Enforcement Matters, ALI-ABA CouRSE oF STUDY: CRIMINAL
ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 181 (1990). This author, an environmental
consultant, explains:
"It [criminal enforcement] creates a stigma for upstanding U.S. corpora-
tions who want to be able to assert they are law abiding, and who want
to be perceived by their employees, customers, and neighbors as such.
Moreover, this criminal prosecution also puts targeted companies and
individuals in the spotlight of press and public attention. Not only do the
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a criminal prosecution may be inherently greater than that of a
civil action.
Although criminal sanctions are a powerful and effective
tool in dealing with environmental problems, private citizens
have not historically possessed the authority to initiate criminal
proceedings. The decision to prosecute is generally made at the
sole discretion of the prosecutor.4 2 Although RICO does not
empower private citizens to bring "criminal" actions as such,
one element of the plaintiff's civil RICO cause of action requires
proof of certain criminal violations by the defendant.
43 Civil
RICO actions may bring the defendant much adverse publicity.
Proof of criminal acts, branding the defendant a "racketeer",
and penalties which include treble damages and attorneys' fees"
may, taken together, give the private plaintiff a club almost as
big as the one the public prosecutor wields with criminal statutes.
This is particularly true with corporate defendants, where incar-
ceration is unavailable as a criminal penalty. 4
In summation, application of RICO to environmental cases
may be beneficial for two reasons. First, the statute may give
individual plaintiffs more remedies and more "leverage" than
they might have under traditional common-law theories or en-
vironmental statutes. Second, civil RICO, as a statute with quasi-
criminal sanctions and implications, may meet society's need for
increased deterrence of environmental violations. As one prose-
cutor said, "[t]he country is full of 'environmental vigilantes'
investors on Wall Street know of the charges, but also do the neighbors
on Main Street. An important part of the leverage that the government
has in these cases is precisely in this public exposure .
Id. at 187.
42 Habicht, supra note 11, at 10481.
41 See infra text accompanying notes 148-159.
- 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
45 Obviously, a corporate entity cannot be imprisoned. See, k.g., R. Gruner,
Corporate Criminals, 12 NAT'L L.J. 30 (April 2, 1990). Many environmental violators
are corporations. Where a plaintiff brings a civil RICO action against a corporate
environmental violator, the remedy is similar to the government's remedy in a criminal
prosecution: money damages. Although probation might be imposed on corporations
convicted under criminal laws, the United States Sentencing Commission "appears to be
backpedaling from some of its harshest proposals for punishing corporations," including
a proposal requiring strict probation for repeat offenders. F. Strasser, Lighter Corporate
Sentencing?, 12 NAT'L L.J. 31 (April 9, 1990). Probation for corporations could con-
ceivably include court-supervised monitoring for future criminal acts, or even charter
revocation. See, e.g., Interview with Carl J. Mayer, 4 Coap. CiuME REP. 16, 17 (Feb.
19, 1990).
1990-91]
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
who quite rightly feel a responsibility to step in and protect the
environment from degradation.""6
III. APPLICATION OF RICO TO ENVIRONMENTAL CASES
A. Mechanics of RICO: an Overview
RICO is a new approach to criminalizing and creating a
cause of action for certain conduct. It is radically different from
most statutory schemes. 47 In fact, it has been asserted that RI-
CO's level of "technicality ... combined with the complex
nature of the environmental laws might prove to be-as a prac-
tical matter-too complicated for the average jury at this time.""8
RICO begins by defining "racketeering activity" in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961. Racketeering activity, otherwise known as "predicate
offenses", includes: (A) any act or threat involving certain fel-
46 Kaye, supra note 6, at 59. But see T. Hookano, The Government Perspective,
17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10260 (July 1987). Hookano, a Deputy Assistant
United States Attorney General, argues that
[a]lthough we generally support the concept of citizen suits, we are con-
cerned that such suits could have a detrimental effect on governmental
enforcement efforts in one of three ways: first, by leading to inappropriate
remedies in enforcement cases; second, by diverting government enforce-
ment resources away from government priorities and toward the concerns
of an array of private interests; and third, by significantly shifting govern-
ment resources away from enforcement and toward regulatory and admin-
istrative processes over the long term.
Id. at 10261. He adds one final concern to his list: plaintiff competence.
With regard to capability we are concerned that lawsuits that may be
brought, for example, under RCRA's substantial endangerment provisions
are very, very complex lawsuits to bring. And we would like to know that
whoever brings suit has the capability to ensure that the litigation results
in a full and fair trial of the issues.
Id. at 10263.
47 See generally ABRAMs, FEDERAL CRnuINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 167-69
(1986).
" Vacco, Government's Response to Compliance in Environmental Matters in the
Western District of New York, ALI-ABA COURSE oF STUDY: CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
OF ENviRoNmENTAL LAWS 41, 44 (1990). The author of this Note disagrees with Mr.
Vacco. Although RICO is complex, it is certainly not beyond the grasp of environmental
practitioners. Nor is it beyond the understanding of juries when used in the governmental
context. In fact, application of RICO to environmental violations may not even require
consideration of "environmental" statutes. See, e.g., Beauford v. Helmsley, 865 F.2d
1386 (2d Cir. 1989) (allowing RICO action to proceed against real estate partnership
and others for predicate acts of mail fraud by concealment of the presence of asbestos
in buildings for sale). Here, CERCLA could not be used because of the "building
materials" exception. See Berger, Many Issues Still Uninterpreted in Numerous Com-
mercial Leases, NAT'L L.J. 18 (May 21, 1990).
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onies "chargeable" under State law, 49 (B) any act which is
"indictable" under selected provisions of title 18 of the United
States Code,5 0 (C) any act which is "indictable" under certain
labor laws," (D) "any offense involving fraud connected with a
case under Title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felo-
nious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying,
selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs,
punishable under any law of the United States" 2 or (E) "any
49 Specifically, these felonies include "any act or threat involving murder, kidnap-
ping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing
in narcotics or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year. ... 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(A).
10 The provisions are:
(B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of
title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224
(relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to coun-
terfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the
act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to em-
bezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to
extortionate credit transactions), section 1029 (relative to fraud and related
activity in connection with access devices), section 1084 (relating to the
transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud),
section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1344 (relating to financial
institution fraud), sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter), section
1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruc-
tion of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of
State or local law enforcement), section 1512 (relating to tampering with a
witness, victim, or an informant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating
against a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1951 (relating to inter-
ference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to
racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering
paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments),
section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses),
section 1956 (relating to the laundering of monetary instruments), section
1957 (relating to engaging in monetary transaction in property derived from
specified unlawful activity), section 1958 (relating to use of interstate
commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire), sections 2251-
2252 (relating to sexual exploitation of children), sections 2312 and 2313
(relating to interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314
and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), section
2321 (relating to trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle
parts), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes),
sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic).
18 U.S.C. § 1961(I)(B).
11 The laws are 29 U.S.C. § 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans
to labor organizations) and 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union
funds). 18 U.S.C. § 1961(I)(C).
52 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(D).
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act which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Trans-
actions Reporting Act." 3
More is required, however, than a mere violation of a pred-
icate act. The four subsections of section 1962 define unlawful
activity under RICO. Section 1962(a) makes it unlawful for a
person who has received income from a "pattern of racketeering
activity" or from the collection of an unlawful debt to "use or
invest" such money or its proceeds in the "acquisition ...
establishment or operation" of "any enterprise which is engaged
in" or "affects" interstate commerce.14 Section 1962(b) makes
it unlawful for a person to acquire or maintain any interest or
control of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity.5  Section 1962(c) punishes conducting the affairs of an en-
terprise through a "pattern" of racketeering activity.16 Section
1962(d) punishes conspiracy.1
7
" Id. at § 1961(1)(B).
14 In its entirety, the section reads:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has partici-
pated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States
Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or
the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the
establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of
securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the
intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of
assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if
the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his
immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racket-
eering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase
do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities
of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to
elect one or more directors of the issuer.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).
,s The section reads:
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain,
directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(b).
"6 The section reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct
of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or
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Section 1963 provides criminal penalties for violating any
provision of section 1962.58 It also provides for mandatory for-
feiture of any interest the convicted person has acquired in
violation of section 1962 and any interest he has in an enterprise
which was operated in violation of section 1962.19
Section 1964 provides:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in
any appropriate United States district court and shall recover
threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.6°
This section also gives the court broad injunctive powers, 6' al-
lows the Attorney General to institute civil proceedings under
the section, 62 and provides for the use of collateral estoppel with
civil defendants who have been convicted criminally.
63
For the time being, it is helpful to note that the "person"
potentially liable for violating section 1962 "includes any indi-
vidual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest
in property. "6 4 The "enterprise" referred to in section 1962
"includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association,
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
collection of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
11 This section reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
58 This section provides for fines and imprisonment for not more than twenty
years. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a).
9 Id.
- 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
61 The statute reads:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent
and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate
orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself
of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable
restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including,
but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type
of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect
interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization
of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(a).
- 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b).
1 Id. at § 1964(d).
" Id. at § 1961(3).
1990-91]
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY [VOL. 6:185
associated in fact although not a legal entity. ' 6 These concepts
will be explored in greater detail below.
B. The Predicate Acts
1. The Absence of Environmental Laws
As explained above, RICO prohibits conduct involving
"racketeering activity," ' which is defined as including a long
list of specified state and federal offenses, otherwise known as
"predicate acts." Conspicuously absent from this long list are
violations .of environmental statutes such as CERCLA, The Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), or the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (the Clean Water Act). 67 However,
the absence of environmental statutes from the list of predicate
acts has not prevented federal prosecutors," state prosecutors, 69
61 Id. at § 1961(4).
" 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d). See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. RICO
also prohibits conduct involving the "collection of an unlawful debt". See 18 U.S.C. §
1962(a), (b) and (c). Since environmental offenses generally involve "racketeering activ-
ity" as opposed to "collection of an unlawful debt," the latter alternate basis of liability
is not explored in this Note.
67 See supra note 4.
" In fact, one federal prosecutor asserts that "[a]lthough there are specific criminal
enforcement sections within the Clean Water Act, RCRA, TSCA, etc., the essential
criminal activity being prosecuted basically involves fraud." Vacco, supra note 48, at
44. He explains that in addition to substantive charges for violations of environmental
laws, "false statements to government officials on manifests (18 U.S.C. § 1001), fraud
against the government (18 U.S.C. § 371) and mail/wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and
1343) provide solid prosecutive tools-especially as it relates to educating the jury on
the real nature of the crimes alleged." Id.
Here, Vacco is referring to the practice of filing charges under the substantive
statutes themselves; he is not asserting that prosecutors consistently use these statutes as
predicate acts for RICO prosecutions. In fact, he asserts that RICO prosecutions for
environmental offenses may be "too complicated for the average jury at this time." See
supra text accompanying note 48.
Federal prosecutors may be acting more aggressively. This author's research has
located three instances of federal RICO prosecutions of polluters. On April 26, 1989, a
waste oil company was indicted under RICO for acts relating to handling hazardous
substances. U.S. v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., CR 88-032-T (D.R.I. April
26, 1988). See, Nittoly, Current Trends of the Prosecution of Environmental Offenses,
ALI-ABA CouRsE O STuDY: CRMtNAl. ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWs 355,
374-75 (1990), citing Toxics Law Rep. 958 (Jan. 24, 1990).
On June 15, 1989, three businessmen were indicted on federal RICO and mail
fraud charges stemming from their operation of a landfill that illegally accepted asbestos
and other waste. See Three Executives in New York Charged With Running Illegal
Asbestos Landfill, Env't Rep. (BNA) 605 (July 28, 1989). The federal prosecutor said
that the defendants face a potential penalty of up to 70 years in prison, $2 million in
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or private plaintiffs70 from using the listed predicate acts in
actions against polluters.
In 1986, one author pointed out that "RICO has been of
marginal importance in the natural resources/environmental law
area of practice with only a few cases having been brought under
its provisions." ' 7' At that time, he saw the "most likely area of
application of RICO" to be in the land use planning area, since
"fraud, kickbacks, and corruption are very common in land
development. 7 2 Here, the predicate acts of mail fraud, wire
fraud, or extortion would conceivably apply."3 Other areas ap-
propriate for use of these predicate acts might include partner-
fines, and forfeiture of assets derived from the racketeering enterprise. Id. at 606. The
case is currently pending. U.S. v. Paccione, No. 89 Cr. 446 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1990)(1990
U.S. Dist. Lexis 666).
The third federal RICO prosecution occurred in the case of United States v. Sacco.
Frank Sacco pled guilty to a RICO charge stemming from "his involvement in the illegal
but highly lucrative operation of two hazardous waste sites north of New York City
.... " United States v. Sacco, 899 F.2d 149, 150 (2d Cir. 1990)(1990 U.S. App. Lexis
4145). He also pled guilty to "various acts of bribery, witness tampering, mall and wire
fraud, and other criminal activities that accompanied the operation of the dumps", and
was sentenced to 80 months in prison. Id. Sacco appealed the calculation of his sentence
under the new sentencing guidelines, but the appeals court affirmed. Id.
61 The landmark state racketeering case involving polluters is Commonwealth v.
Lavelle, No. 83 CR.615(a) (Pa. Ct. C.P. Lackawanna Cty. Aug. 23, 1985), 16 Envt'l.
L. Rep. (Envt'l. L. Inst.) 20497 (June 1986). Lavelle was prosecuted under Pennsylvan-
ia'a racketeering act, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 911, which includes the offense of theft by
deception (18 PA. CoNs. STAT. Ann. § 3922(a)(1) (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1990) as a
predicate act for showing "racketeering activity." The Commonwealth alleged that
Lavelle committed over 700 acts of theft by deception by taking orders to dispose of
waste after misrepresenting to the waste generators that he possessed valid disposal
permits. Lavelle, 16 Envt'l. L. Rep. at 20497-98. Lavelle was found guilty and was
sentenced to serve "from one and one-half to four years in prison and fined $50,000."
Pennsylvania Waste Hauler Sentenced to up to Four Years for Illegal Disposal, 16 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1411 (Nov. 22, 1985). It is believed that Lavelle was the first case of its
kind, and as of 1985, his sentence was "one of the longest ever imposed in a toxic waste
case in the United States." Id.
In 1985, Pennsylvania filed another state racketeering/toxic waste action. The
defendant, William Fiore, was charged with conducting a pattern of racketeering activity
by bribing public officials in order to facilitate his illegal waste disposal practices. See
Pennsylvania Landfill Owner Charged, 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 280 (June 14, 1985).
"o This Note cites numerous cases involving private plaintiffs whose property is
injured by violators of environmental laws, and bring actions under RICO, alleging mall
or wire fraud as predicate acts. See, e.g., Boone v. Beacon Bldg. Corp., 613 F. Supp.
1151 (D.N.J. 1985), (landowners in vicinity of toxic landfill sue builders and realtors
under RICO).
1 Binder, The Potential Application of RICO in the Natural Resources/Environ-
mental Law Context, 63 DEN. U.L. Rv. 535, 559 (1986).
72 Id. at 560.
" Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
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ship fraud, tax shelter scams, mineral exploration, and toxic
waste.
7 4
Another commentator, Theodore Smith, pointed out that the
predicate act of securities fraud is "of particular relevance to
the oil and gas and mining industries" because the "sale of
various interests in oil or gas or a mineral in place, or of a
producing well, may constitute a security. ' ' 7" Also, the predicate
acts of theft from interstate shipments or interference with com-
merce (18 U.S.C. §§ 659 and 1951) may have particular relevance
to natural resources disputes, as "most oil or gas or minerals
end up in interstate commerce." ' 76 Smith asserts that "a disa-
greement over whether proper payment has been made [for the
oil or gas] arguably becomes theft from a shipment in interstate
commerce. ' 77 Finally, he points out that in situations where a
natural resources business "alleges that a competitor has taken
some action which constitutes improper interference with a fed-
eral or state regulatory agency", an attempt might be made to
invoke one of these sections [18 U.S.C. § 1503 - obstruction of
justice or 18 U.S.C. § 1511 - obstruction of state or local law
enforcement] to create a predicate act. 78 The possibilities are
endless, and none should be ruled out.
Surprisingly, Smith asserts that "[e]xamples of specified
crimes which one would not expect to find in natural resources
contexts include bribery . . . federal bankruptcy fraud; and vi-
olation of any law . . . punishing drug transactions. ' 79 In fact,
it is easy to imagine scenarios where polluters have bribed gov-
ernment inspectors, 0 where a polluter fraudulently files bank-
ruptcy in order to escape liability under environmental laws, 8'
74 Binder, supra note 71 at 560.





" Id. at 6-4 to 6-5 n.9.
0 This occurred in the racketeering/hazardous waste case of United States v.
Sacco, 899 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1990). See supra note 68.
11 Cf. United States v. Whizco, 841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. (1988). No fraud was
alleged in Whizco; a coal operator filed for bankruptcy in order to discharge land
reclamation obligations imposed by the Surface Mining and Reclamation Control Act,
30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328. The Sixth Circuit allowed the discharge. See also Comment,
United States v. Whizco: Are SMCRA Obligations Dischargeable Under the Bankruptcy
Code?, 5 J. MiN. L. & POL'Y 171 (1989-90). It is easy to imagine a scenario where a
hazardous waste operator contaminates surrounding land and subsequently attempts to
fraudulently discharge his remedial obligations under CERCLA through bankruptcy.
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or where an operator of an illegal cocaine or amphetamine
laboratory improperly stores or disposes of hazardous chemicals
such as acetone or other solvents.
Rather than attempting to list all the cases involving different
predicate acts,82 or even attempting to consider the issues in-
volved in proving each possible type of predicate act possible in
the environmental/natural resources area, this Note concentrates
on cases and issues dealing with mail fraud
3 and wire fraud. 4
It has been suggested that "the predicate acts most relevant to
toxic waste RICO litigation are mail fraud and wire fraud. "85
The importance of using these crimes as predicate offenses in a
RICO action lies in their extraordinary scope and breadth and
"unusual flexibility." 8 6 The rationale behind the courts' willing-
ness to liberally apply mail and wire fraud was summed up by
Chief Justice Burger, who said, "The criminal mail fraud statute
must remain strong to be able to cope with the new varieties of
fraud that the ever-inventive American 'con artist' is sure to
develop. "87
2. Proving Mail or Wire Fraud
The plaintiff in a civil RICO case must first take the role of
a public prosecutor, in that a prima facie case of mail fraud is
12 Smith, supra note 75, is a good reference source for "natural resources" cases
involving numerous types of predicate acts. His cases include "true environmental"
disputes (i.e., actions by plaintiffs who are injured by reason of environmental contam-
ination), but most cases cited merely involve business disputes over oil, gas, coal and
other natural resources transactions and related securities transactions.
" 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1984 & Supp. 1990).
, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1984 & Supp. 1990).
" Note, The Applicability of Civil RICO to Toxic Waste Polluters, 62 IND. L.J.
451, 470-71 (1987).
" N. ABRAMS, FEDERAL CmuNAL LAW AND ITs ENFORCEMENT 271 (1986). Abrams
says:
Most often, mail fraud prosecutions are initiated where the facts show a
classic case of fraud-conduct amounting to the crime of obtaining prop-
erty by false pretenses. However, the statute is increasingly being used to
prosecute conduct not amounting to traditional criminal fraud but which
may involve other crimes such as bribery or extortion. Sometimes too,
what is involved does not amount to criminal conduct at all, apart from
the mail fraud statute. The conduct involved may take place in a commer-
cial or corporate setting or involve a state or local government official;
increasingly the mail fraud statute is being used to prosecute various forms
of commercial bribery and political corruption.
Id. at 271-72.
These comments apply equally to wire fraud, as the statutory language and court
interpretations of that statute mirror those of the mail fraud statute.
" United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 407 (1974)(Burger, J., dissenting).
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required if mail fraud violations are to be used as the predicate
offenses for showing a "pattern of racketeering activity.' ' Proof
of wire fraud is similar to proof of mail fraud; the statute
requires a showing that the defendant "transmits or causes to
be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communi-
cation . .. any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for
the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice. '"89
i. Scheme or Artifice
As previously discussed, the concept of "scheme or artifice
to defraud" is broad indeed.9 Since 1896, the mail fraud statute
has been recognized to cover a much wider scope of conduct
than common-law fraud.9' Thus, "scheme or artifice to defraud"
includes "misrepresentations as to some existing fact" as well
as "promises as to the future." 92 To make out a prima facie
case of mail fraud, it is unnecessary to show that the defendant
actually benefitted from the scheme, 93 nor is it necessary to show
that anybody was actually defrauded by the scheme.94
It is important to note that in the context of civil RICO,
courts sometimes confuse the plaintiff's requirement of proving
" The full text of the mail fraud statute reads:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraud-
ulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan,
exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for
unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other
article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such
counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme
or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized
depository for mall matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or
delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such
matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mall according to
the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered
by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both. If the violation affects a financial institution, such person shall be
fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or
both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341.
9 Id. at § 1343.
See supra notes 88-89.
9 Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
92 Id.
91 United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S.
1110 (1983).
" United States v. Gaskill, 491 F.2d 981, 984 n.5 (8th Cir. 1974).
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a prima facie case of mail fraud to show a "pattern of racket-
eering activity" with the requirement of proving injuries com-
pensable under RICO. For example, in Garbade v. Great Divide
Mining & Milling Corporation," the district court considered a
RICO complaint filed by a shareholder of the mining company.
The plaintiff alleged that Levin (Great Divide's majority share-
holder and treasurer) fraudulently, for his own benefit and with-
out authority, executed a mineral lease to a third party.96 The
court refused to allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint to
include a RICO change because
Levin's acts in executing the lease itself do not constitute a
"scheme or artifice to defraud" insofar as Garbade, Jr. is
concerned. The alleged fraudulent misrepresentations which
Levin made through the mails and/or wires in connection with
execution of the . . . lease were made, if at all, [to the third
party lessee]. Garbade, Jr. has made no showing of injury by
virtue of execution of the lease. Indeed he cannot make any
such showing, because execution of the lease per se worked no
fraud on him. 97
The Garbade court confused the issue of "scheme or artifice"
with standing, or proof of injury. RICO section 1964(c) author-
izes civil recovery for injury "by reason of a violation of section
1962 ... "98 Section 1962 prohibits certain activities involving
a "pattern of racketeering activity." 99 The definition of "rack-
eteering activity" includes "any act . . . indictable under ...
section 1343 (relating to mail fraud) . . . . 10 Thus, although
failure to show injury is an issue related to section 1964, it is
not a requirement for proving the existence of predicate acts
sufficient to meet the requirements of section 1962.
Another issue in proving a "scheme or artifice to defraud"
involves the money, property, or right at which the fraud is
directed. For example, in the case of In Re Gas Reclamation,
Inc. Securities Litigation,10' investor plaintiffs alleged "factual
misrepresentations about the merits and track record of the gas
91 645 F. Supp. 808 (D. Colo. 1986), aff'd 831 F.2d 212 (10th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 810.
Id. at 815-16.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
Id. at § 1962(a)-(d).
Id. at § 1961(1)(B).
10, 659 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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reclamation program, . . . which induced them to invest.' '0 2
Here, the fraud was directed toward the plaintiff's property,
i.e., the plaintiffs alleged the defendants defrauded them of
money. The court held that the plaintiff's allegations, if true,
"could form the basis of indictable offenses under the federal
mail and wire fraud statutes .. 1.. ,,03
A problem may arise where the fraud is directed at something
that is not clearly "property." In McNally v. United States,'0
4
the Supreme Court held that the mail fraud statute is not aimed
at "the intangible right of the citizenry to good government,"
it protects only "property" rights. 05 Since a large class of en-
vironmental actions based on RICO may allege fraud in procur-
ing government licenses,'06 the question of whether a government
license is "property" may arise. Before McNally, prosecutions
for schemes to obtain licenses by fraud were sustained on the
"intangible rights" theory.1° After McNally, several courts of
appeal held that government licenses "do not create contractual
or property rights"' 08 and thus, false information submitted to
101 Id. at 512.
10 Id. at 513.
-- 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
,01 Id. at 356, 360.
106 See, e.g., Case v. Dillier, No. IP 85-436-C, 1986 WL 22213, RICO Bus. Disp.
Guide (CCH) 6486, (S.D. Ind. Nov. 7, 1986). Here, the plaintiffs alleged that defendants
secured well-drilling permits and salt waste disposal permits by "falsely representing to
the Indiana Department of Natural Resources that they were in compliance with state
oil and gas regulations, laws, rules and orders." Id. The court held that the plaintiffs
"properly alleged a pattern of racketeering activity by pleading criminal acts [against
the government]." Id. At issue in this case was whether the plaintiffs could use acts
against the government as proof of a "pattern or racketeering activity," which is another
essential element of a RICO action. The court seemed to take for granted that the
deceptive acts in securing licenses amounted to mail fraud, as the issue of whether the
licenses were "property" was not addressed. Significantly, this case was decided three
years before McNally. Before McNally, most courts assumed that intangible rights could
be targets of mail fraud. See, e.g., United States v. Berg, 710 F. Supp. 438, 441
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing numerous appellate decisions).
"0' United States v. Berg, 710 F. Supp. 438, 441 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). Berg cites several
pre-McNally decisions upholding convictions involving fraudulent license applications
which deprived the government of its "intangible right" to honest information from the
applicant. Id.
'0 United States v. Slay, 717 F. Supp. 689, 693 (E.D. Mo. 1989)(distinguishing
licenses from government franchises, which become property in the form of a binding
contract). One case, United States v. Murphy, 836 F.2d 248 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 924, (1988), held that a state was not deprived of "property" by reason of the
defendant's false information on his application for a bingo permit, because the permit
was the defendant's property, not the state's. Id. at 253-54. United States v. Ferrara,
701 F. Supp. 39, 42 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 868 F.2d 1268 (2d Cir. 1988) used the same
rationale and reached the same result in the context of licenses to practice medicine.
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the government by applicants does not constitute a violation of
the mail fraud statute.'1
9
A creative plaintiff's attorney can often avoid the pitfalls of
McNally. First, it is important to note that McNally did not
hold that all intangible rights are not covered by the mail fraud
statute; it merely held that "schemes to defraud citizens of their
intangible rights to honest and impartial government" are neither
tangible nor intangible "property."" 0 The Supreme Court ex-
plained in a later case that with respect to confidential business
information, "its intangible nature does not make it any less
'property' protected by the mail and wire fraud statutes."' '
With this understanding of McNally, it is easy to envision a
hypothetical scenario in the natural resources context. If, for
example, a mining and exploration company employee "leaks"
confidential information on mineral deposits to his employer's
competitors, it should be no defense that the information was
"intangible," and thus did not constitute "property."
Second, a plaintiff's attorney may be able to avoid the
pitfalls of McNally through artful drafting of the complaint.
Consider the example of a hazardous waste transporter who lies
to the government on permit applications. The waste transporter
may intend not only to deprive the citizens of their right to
honest information in RCRA permits (not a "property right"
under McNally), but he may also intend to defraud others of
their property by misrepresenting the status of his permit. This
was the situation in United States v. Case."12 There, the indict-
ment alleged that the defendants
did knowingly and wilfully ... conspire ... to devise and
intend to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud the citizens
of the State ... [the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection and the Sewerage Commissioners] ... as well as
generators of industrial chemical wastes by means of false and
fraudulent pretenses, representations and promises regarding
"' See supra note 88.
'o McNally, 483 U.S. at 356, 360.
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987). Carpenter involved the mail
fraud prosecution of R. Foster Winans, a reporter for the Wall Street Journal, for
leaking confidential information to stock purchasers. The Court held that as Winans'
employer, the Journal had a right to protect the confidentiality of their information,
and that "[c]onfidential business information has long been recognized as property."
Id. at 26.
,"2 684 F. Supp. 109 (D.N.J. 1988), aff'd 866 F.2d 1413 (3d Cir. 1988).
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the transportation, treatment, recovery and disposal of indus-
trial chemical wastes and to utilize the mail for the purpose of
executing this scheme and artifice." 3
The defendant argued that his conviction violated the McNally
rule." 4 The court rejected this argument, pointing out that the
defendants falsely represented to waste generators that they would
dispose of their waste lawfully." 5 In fact, the defendants illegally
disposed of the waste through the sewer system, and attempted
to conceal the illegal disposal by submitting false reports to
government agencies." 6 As a result of these deceptions, the
defendants obtained contracts and payments ("property") from
the waste generators." 7 The court found that the object of the
conspiracy was "clearly alleged, which is namely to make false
statements to induce generators and public entities to believe the
defendants were disposing of hazardous wastes legally, all so
that defendants could continue their business and continue to
charge generators.""" It was irrelevant whether financial gain
was the defendant's primary intent, because "[u]nder the mail
fraud statute, reckless indifference for the truth is also consid-
ered fraudulent."" 9 At trial, "overwhelming proofs were pro-
duced establishing the false statements to the three categories of
entities [the Department of Environmental Protection, the sew-
erage commissioners, and the waste generators] .. . for the
purpose of obtaining continued business and payments from the
generators."'' 20 Therefore, there was a "plan intended to obtain
by false representations money or property,"'' 2' and the convic-
tion was upheld.
Third, it is important to note that McNally was based upon
the language of the mail fraud statute as it existed in 1987. In
1988, Congress "overruled" McNally when it added section 1346
to the mail fraud chapter of the criminal code, which states,
"For purposes of this chapter, the term 'scheme or artifice to
,' Id. at 110.
I" d. at 113.
"5 Id. at 114.
116 Id. at 110, 114.
- Id. at 115.
I Case, 684 F. Supp. at 110-111 (quoting United States v. Case, No. 82-200, Tr.
at 16 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 1982)).
9 Id. at 112.
- Id. at 114.
121 Id. at 115; see supra note 88 (text of mail fraud statute).
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defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to defraud another of the
intangible right of honest service." 2 2 This statute clearly applies
to conduct occurring after the date of its passage. It is equally
clear that it could not apply to conduct occurring after McNally,
but before section 1346 was passed.' 23 The question of whether
section 1346 should be applied retroactively to conduct that
occurred before McNally was addressed in United States v.
Berg.'4 First, this court found that given "Congress's swift
action [in passing section 1346 following the McNally decision],
... Congress intended section 1346 to be applied retroac-
tively.' 1  Second, the court found that it would not be unfair
to apply section 1346 to Berg because, at the time of Berg's
conduct, "every Circuit that had considered the question had
held that the wire fraud statute proscribed schemes to defraud
persons of 'intangible' rights like the right to the honest services
of local government officials.'" The court also pointed out that
it was unnecessary to base its ruling entirely on the retroactivity
issue, and offered alternate rationales related to the issue of
government licenses or permits as "property.' 127
Finally, it should be noted that even in situations where the
McNally rule does apply, it does not require proof that the
scheme or artifice reach fruition, and it does not require proof
that the intended victim was actually defrauded of property.'"
1- 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988).
2 Ex Post Facto laws are prohibited by Article I, § 9 of the Constitution of the
United States. The Supreme Court explained that these laws are prohibited because
defendants have a right to fair notice of what type of conduct gives rise to criminal
sanctions. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977).
12, 710 F. Supp. 438 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
,2, Id. at 442.
6 Id. at 443.
I" Berg was prosecuted for wire fraud based on his false representations concerning
his application for an arms export license. Berg, 710 F. Supp. at 439. The Berg court
rejected cases like Murphy, see case cited supra note 108, which stated that licenses are
only "property" in the hands of the defendant. The Berg court noted that a rule that
"such valuable property vanishes when held in the hands of the issuer strikes the Court
as preposterous." Berg, 710 F. Supp. at 444.
The Berg court also proposed a third potential basis for its ruling: since under
federal law, the government has the right to seize arms which are being exported in
violation of law, by "concealing the nature of their illegal arms sales through false
export license applications, defendants attempted to deprive the government of its right
to repossess arms shipped in violation of law." Id. Thus, the scheme sought to deprive
the government of a "chose in action-a valuable, intangible property right." Id. at
444-45.
I See, e.g., United States v. Dynalectric Co., 859 F.2d 1559, 1576 (1lth Cir. 1988),
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For example, in United States v. Rico Industries, Inc.,129 the
defendant, an employee of a public utility, received a kickback
on a natural gas purchase contract he negotiated for his em-
ployer. 30 The defendant argued that the utility suffered no loss
of property because they would merely pass on the cost to
consumers.' Rejecting this argument, the court found that the
utility had a right to sell gas to its customers at the lowest
possible rate, that the defendant had deprived the utility of this
right, and that the right deprived was in fact "property."'3 2
ii. Mailing for the Purpose of Executing the Scheme
Technically, the mail fraud statute does not criminalize the
scheme or artifice to defraud. Rather, it criminalizes the act of
distributing through the mails "any matter or thing" for the
"purpose of executing such scheme or artifice."'3 In fact, each
separate use of the mails constitutes a separate crime under the
statute.1 "However, delivery of items by private messenger does
not bring fraudulent conduct within the scope of the mail fraud
statute.'3- The mailings need not actually contain false state-
ments; it is sufficient if they merely "advance the execution of
the scheme.' ' 36 For example, the Gas Reclamation case involved
a RICO suit filed by investors in a natural gas reclamation
venture. 37 The court stated that if the plaintiffs could prove that
a defendant who rendered accounting services in connection with
the sale of the investment units had mailed engagement letters
that "furthered the plan," then "such mailings would constitute
mail fraud." 138 Also, the mere fact that a writing was mailed by
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989) (upholding defendants' mail fraud convictions for
utilizing the mails for a construction bid-rigging scheme).
-- 854 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, 860 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989).
,30 Id. at 711.
"I Id. at 713.
12 Id. at 714.
'" 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
134 United States v. McClelland, 868 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1989)(holding that each of
three mailings made for the common purpose of making fraudulent insurance claims
constitutes a mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud).
"I Utz v. Correa, 631 F. Supp. 592, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)(hand delivered draft
letter of apology as part of a fraud scheme not a violation of mail fraud statute).
1 In Re Gas Reclamation, Inc. Securities Litigation, 659 F. Supp. 493, 513 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
17 Id. at 499.
I" Id. at 513.
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a person other than the defendant does not preclude conviction
for mail fraud, if the defendant can reasonably foresee that the
mailing will occur.139 Furthermore, it is not required that the
mailings be an "essential element" of the scheme, so long as it
is "in furtherance" of the scheme."4 However, the mailing is
not "in furtherance" of the scheme if the scheme has been
consummated at the time of the mailing, and the mailing plays
a minimal part or no part at all in the success of the scheme.'
4'
The key issue is whether the mailing plays a significant part
in the success of the scheme. For example, in Mitchell v. United
States 42 the defendant fraudulently induced victims to purchase
oil and gas leases. 43 Evidence of the leases was mailed to the
"purchasers."'" As the leases were sold, they were mailed to a
government agency for recording and returned to the purchasers
via mail. 4 The court rejected the defendant's contention that
because the mailings occurred after the defendants had received
payment, they were not "in furtherance" of the scheme.'" The
court held that the mailings were in fact "in furtherance,"
because the success of the scheme depended upon its continuing
nature. 141
iii. Proof of Predicate Acts in Civil RICO Cases
Although the plaintiff in a civil RICO case must play the
role of a prosecutor in proving commission of the predicate
offenses,' 48 the private plaintiff's task in one sense is easier than
the prosecutor's. First, in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc. ,"49
the United States Supreme Court held that plaintiffs in civil
RICO actions need not allege that the defendants have been
previously convicted under criminal RICO or under any predi-
"' United States v. Bortnovsky, 879 F.2d 30, 36 (2d Cir. 1989).
1,o United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 680 (10th Cir. 1989) (The use of the
mails need only be "incident to an essential part of the scheme" or simply "a step in
[the] plot.")
"I United States v. Haynes, 620 F. Supp. 474, 491-82 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).







'4' See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
,9 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
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cate act." 0 Before Sedima, many courts-including ones consid-
ering environmental cases-had imposed a prior conviction
requirement in civil RICO actions."' Although Sedima is the law
now-at least until Congress sees fit to change it-some defense
attorneys have cleverly attempted to circumvent the ruling. They
have asked courts to impose a requirement that a civil RICO
claim "allege the predicate acts of racketeering activity with as
much specificity as a criminal bill of particulars."'15 2 The Dillier
court,'3 considering this argument in the context of a RICO
action alleging mail and wire fraud in the procurement of oil
drilling and disposal permits, properly rejected it.
54
The argument was fully set forth in Haroco v. American
National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago.' There, the defendant
first noted that RICO requires at least two "indictable" acts to
prove a "pattern of racketeering activity."'15 6 Since an offense is
not "indictable" based on mere allegations, but rather must be
I"' Id. at 488-89. The Court explained that as "defined in the statute, racketeering
activity consists not of acts for which the defendant has been convicted, but of acts for
which he could be." Id. at 488. The Court offered a dual rationale for this holding:
First, RICO's language does not refer to "convictions"; it merely requires the predicate
acts "involve conduct that is 'chargeable' or 'indictable', and [it refers to] 'offense[sl'
that are 'punishable' under various criminal statutes." Id., citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
Second, a prior criminal conviction requirement would be contrary to the policy envi-
sioned by Congress, as it would arbitrarily restrict the availability of private actions.
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 490, n.9.
" See, e.g., New York v. O'Hara, 595 F. Supp. 1101 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), vacated
779 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1985). In O'Hara, New York brought a civil RICO action for
allegedly fraudulent conduct by the defendants in connection with contracts for remedial
work at the Love Canal hazardous waste disposal site. The district court dismissed the
action because the "complaint herein does not allege any convictions for predicate
offenses ...." Id. at 1102. Specifically, the suit alleged that government units were
overcharged between $4 million and $5 million for the cleanup, and that the former
Niagara Falls City Manager had received payments from one of the defendants in
exchange for recommending that the city council approve the defendant as primary
contractor in the waste cleanup project. New York v. O'Hara, No. 83-1440C (W.D.N.Y.
1983). See also Former Town Official, Contractor, Sued for Alleged Overcharges in
Waste Cleanup, 14 Env't Rep. (BNA) 36 (Jan. 6, 1984).
"I Case v. Dillier, No. IP 85-436-c, 1986 WL 22213, RICO Bus. Disp. Guide
(CCH) 6486 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 7, 1986)(quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank
and Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985)).
153 Id.
'5' Id. The Dillier court considered the argument as an issue related to FED. R.
CrV. PRO. 9(b), which requires specificity in pleading fraud. See infra notes 160-161 and
accompanying text for discussion of Rule 9(b). Actually, the argument goes beyond Rule
9(b) issues. See infra notes 162-178 and accompanying text.
M5 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd., 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
'56 Id. at 403, citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
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based upon probable cause, 57 the defendant's syllogism con-
cluded that a civil RICO complaint must be "as specific as a
criminal bill of particulars and must establish probable
cause. . . .,"' The court rejected this argument, explaining that
the proposed requirement was "impractical" and contrary to the
purpose of civil RICO.'59
Although the plaintiff should not be required to plead a
complaint with the same level of specificity as a bill of particulars
in a criminal indictment, Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure does require that "the circumstances constituting fraud
or mistake shall be stated with particularity." 6 Therefore, Rule
9(b) should concern any party to a RICO action alleging mail
or wire fraud. The Second Circuit has held that Rule 9(b)
requires the plaintiff to specify:
1) precisely what statements were made in what documents
or oral misrepresentations or what omissions were made,
2) the time and place of each such statement and the person
responsible for making (or, in the case of omissions, not
making) the same,
3) the context of such statements and the manner in which
they misled the plaintiffs, and
4) what defendants obtained as a consequence of the fraud.' 61
The district court in Dart Construction Co., Inc. v. Marriott
Corp. 62 applied the Second Circuit's rule in the context of a
toxic waste/RICO case. The plaintiff, a landfill operator, al-
lowed soil from land owned by the Marriott Corporation to be
Is? Id.
158 Id.
,19 Id. at 404. The court explained:
First, a determination of probable cause in the criminal context ordinarily
involves some evaluation of the reliability of specific evidence. Even the
most specific allegations do not establish' probable cause unless they are
reliable. We are, to say the least, perplexed as to how a court might
undertake such evaluations of reliability in deciding a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12. Id.
The court also pointed out that grand juries, with their broad investigative powers,
can be useful in establishing probable cause in criminal cases. However, the civil plaintiff
"has no similar discovery rights until it files its complaint." Id.
,61 FED. R. Cirv. P. 9(b).
161 Dart Construction Co., Inc. v. Marriott Corp., No. 88 Civ. 6196 (SWKO, 1990
U.S. Dist. Lexis 1207)(Feb. 7, 1990), at 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14 (citing Beres v. Thomson
McKinnon, No. 85 Civ. 6674, slip op. at 18 (S.D.N.Y. September 1, 1989)).
I" d.
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disposed at its landfill. It claimed that Marriott committed a
fraud upon the transporter who delivered the soil to the landfill.
Specifically, Dart alleged that Marriott misrepresented to the
transporter that the soil was not contaminated with hazardous
substances. 63 The district court held that the plaintiff satisfied
the four-prong inquiry for compliance with Rule 9(b), since he
alleged that 1) "Marriott represented to [the transporter] that
the . . . soil was not contaminated . .," 64 2) the transporter,
"in a letter dated October 22, 1987, stated that the ... soil was
'non-toxic, non-hazardous and not industrial waste,'" 65 3) "this
misrepresentation allegedly caused plaintiff to accept the contam-
inated soil for landfill cover, leading to the permanent injunction
closing plaintiff's business";'6 and 4) "as a result of depositing
the .. . soil . . .defendants avoided having to pay for the cost
of dumping the soil in an approved ...landfill as required by
New Jersey law". 67
The District Court in Huntsman-Christensen Corporation v.
Mountain Fuel Supply Co.,'6 another toxic waste/RICO case,
also considered the application of Rule 9(b). The plaintiffs al-
leged that one group of defendants (the "Mountain Fuel Defen-
dants") mailed fraudulent letters to government officials for the
purpose of concealing "masSive contamination" of land which
the defendants leased to the plaintiffs. 69 The Mountain Fuel
Defendants argued that the plaintiff's complaint failed to comply
with the requirements of Rule 9(b), relying on language in a
Utah District Court opinion which, read alone, seemed to suggest
that the Rule 9(b) requirements for a RICO complaint might be
more stringent than for more traditional causes of action based
on fraud. 70 The Huntsman-Christensen court rejected this ar-
,61 Id. at 14.
I6 Id.
165 Id.
1 Id. at 15.
167 Dart Construction Co., No. 88 Civ. 6196 at 2990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15.
68 No. C86-530G, slip op. at 21 (C.D. Utah, Nov. 24, 1986) (Lexis, Genfed library,
Dist. file).
I Id. at 22.
"'1 Id. at 23. The defendants cited Grant v. Union Bank, 629 F. Supp. 570, 576
(D. Utah 1986), which stated:
[B]ecause the RICO statute is based upon criminality it seems appropriate
that the pleadings be sufficiently particular to show the indictability of the
alleged offender. We consider this to be an appropriate requirement in
view of the statutory language and the far reaching sanctions of RICO.
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gument, pointing out that the opinion relied upon by the defen-
dants specifically disclaimed a higher standard of particularity
for RICO complaints. 17' However, the court found, with respect
to some of the defendants, that the pleadings failed to meet even
the usual standards under Rule 9(b).17 2 Huntsman-Christensen is
important for one more reason; the court noted that the require-
ments of Rule 9(b) "may be relaxed when the relevant facts are
peculiarly within the opposing party's knowledge as a result of
the fraud being perpetrated on a third party."'
73
It should be noted that the Second Circuit's rule requiring
an allegation of the time and place of the fraudulent statements
74
is not universally followed. For example, the district court in
Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. U.S. Gypsum,'7 an
asbestos contamination/RICO case, pointed out that allegations
of "date, place or time" serve the purpose of Rule 9(b), but the
rule does not require them. 7 6 This court's view of the rule was
that it "simply mandates that the actions establishing the fraud
be pleaded with greater particularity than other plead-
P P'177ings....
"I Huntsman-Christensen Corp., No. C86-530G, slip op. at 23. The Grant court
stated that it "is doubtful that the courts which strictly construe Rule 9(b) would require
more particularity with reference to the plaintiffs pleading the predicate acts for RICO
than they would as to other causes of action pleading fraud." Grant, 629 F. Supp. at
576.
,72 Huntsman-Christensen Corp., No. C86-530G, slip op. at 24. Rule 9(b) requires
that each defendant be apprised of the specific allegations of fraud directed against that
defendant. See, e.g., Beck v. Cantor, Fitzgerald & Co., 621 F. Supp. 1547, 1551 (N.D.
Ill. 1985). Since "most of the specifically pleaded enumerated acts allegedly were com-
mitted by [one corporate defendant-namely Entrada Industries], with the other defen-
dants just thrown into the Complaint through all encompassing allegations," the court
dismissed the RICO complaint against numerous individual defendants without prejudice
and with leave to amend. Id.
I Huntsman-Christensen Corp., No. C86-530G, slip op. at n.5, citing Dominicus
Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Industries, 473 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The
Huntsman-Christensen court noted that in such a situation, either dismissal without
prejudice (with leave to amend) or provisional denial of a motion to strike (with leave
to renew) is the appropriate judicial response until discovery is completed. Huntsman-
Christensen, Corp., No. C86-530G, slip op. at n.5.
'7 See supra text accompanying note 161.
'17 711 F. Supp. 1244 (D.N.J. 1989).
171 Id. at 1263 (quoting Seville Industrial Machinery v. South Most Machinery, 742
F.2d 786, 791 (3d Cir. 1984)). The court described the purpose of Rule 9(b) as "safe-
guard[ing] defendants against spurious charges of immoral and fraudulent behavior."
Prudential, 711 F. Supp. at 1263. The court also held that Rule 9(b) does not require
the complaint to allege the "precise words used." Id. Rather, a "description of the
nature and subject of the representation is sufficient." Id.
I" Id. (quoting Saporito v. Combustion Engineering Inc., 843 F.2d 666, 675-76 (3d
Cir. 1988)).
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Clearly, different courts have different ideas about the level
of specificity required by Rule 9(b).178 This author can only
suggest that before a complaint is drafted, the practitioner should
check the law in the particular jurisdiction where the suit will
be filed.
The second reason a civil RICO action may be easier to win
than a criminal RICO prosecution involves the burden of proof.
The RICO statute does not specify a burden of proof to be used
in civil actions. 179 In 1984, this was not a fully settled matter for
the courts. 80 However, in 1985, the United States Supreme Court
strongly suggested that in civil RICO cases, the predicate acts
may be proved "under a preponderance standard.''8 In Stan-
For an example of a complaint found to be "nebulous" (i.e., not specific
enough to meet the requirements of Rule 9(b)), see Case v. Dillier, No. IP 85-436-C,
1986 WL 22213, Rico Bus. Disp. Guide (CCH) 6486 (S.D. Ind., Nov. 7, 1986). The
complaint which was found defective read as follows:
(d) having the intent to defraud plaintiffs and others, and for the purpose
of executing the scheme or artifice described in subparagraph (a)-(7),
defendants transmitted or caused to be transmitted in interstate commerce
by means of wire or radio communications certain signals or sounds, to
wit:
(1) Two or more telephone conversations made, or which defendants rea-
sonably contemplated would be made, between defendants, or some person
acting on their behalf, and an inspector for the Indiana Department of
Natural Resources, regarding the plugging and subsequent well plugging
affidavits for the Case No. I oil well, and the Drake-Lowry No. I oil well,
on unknown dates, from and to unknown locations.
(2) Other telephone conversations made, or which defendants reasonably
contemplated would be made between defendants, or some person acting
on their behalf, and other unknown persons, regarding the plugging or
well plugging affidavits for the Case No. 1 oil well, and the Drake-Lowry
No. I oil well, on unknown dates, from and to unknown locations.
Id. at n.2.
I" Haroco v. American Nat. B. & T. Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 404 (7th Cir.
1984), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
1 Id. at 404-05 (citing various opinions and authors).
"I Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
Specifically, the Court stated:
We are not at all convinced that the predicate acts must be established
beyond a reasonable doubt .... In a number of settings, conduct that can
be punished as criminal only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt will
support civil sanctions under a preponderance standard. [citations omitted]
That the offending conduct is described by reference to criminal statutes
does not mean that its occurrence must be established by criminal standards
or that the consequences of a finding of liability in a private civil action
are identical to the consequences of a criminal conviction.
Id. at 491.
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dard Equipment, Inc. v. Boeing Co.,182 possibly this country's
first toxic waste/RICO action, a district court also suggested,
without holding as such, that the words "indictable" and
"chargeable" in RICO would "not likely require proof beyond
a reasonable doubt."' 83 On the surface, this rationale seems
consistent with the Supreme Court's Sedima decision, which held
that the "indictable" language does not require prior criminal
convictions in civil RICO actions.'8 The problem with looking
at this particular statutory language to answer the burden of
proof question is that it leads to the erroneous conclusion that
the burden of proof in civil RICO actions should be the same
as that in indictments, i.e., "probable cause."'' 5 The courts have
rejected such a notion.'1
Despite the confusion, the trend appears to favor the usual
"preponderance" standard for civil cases. 8 7 As the United States
Supreme Court has yet to specifically rule on this issue, it is
necessary for a practitioner to check the local rule in the partic-
ular jurisdiction where the RICO suit is filed to find the appli
cable standard.
C. The RICO Cause of Action
Of course, mere proof of predicate acts does not make out
a prima facie case under civil RICO. The plaintiff must also
prove the existence of a "pattern of racketeering,' ' 8 8 the exis-
tence of an "enterprise,"' ' 8 9 and show injury "by reason of a
violation of section 1962."'19 Furthermore, it is the "person"''
-not the "enterprise" -which is liable under RICO.
"Persons" are subjected to liability under three substantive
(non-conspiracy) subsections of 18 U.S.C. § 1962. Section 1962(a)
112 No. C84-1129M, 16 Envt'l. L. Rep. 20246 (Envt'l. L. Inst.) (W.D. Wash. Feb.
5, 1985).
Id. at 20248.
See supra notes 150 and accompanying text.
,' In fact, the Standard Equipment court, in dicta, tentatively reached this conclu-
sion. Standard Equip., 16 Envt'l. L. Rep. at 20248.
,s6 See supra text accompanying notes 155-159.
See, e.g., United States v. Local 560, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J. 1984).
1' 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), (5).
,8 Id. at § 1961(1), (4).
' Id. at § 1964(c).
"I Id. at § 1961(3).
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prohibits the act of investing in an enterprise any income (or its
proceeds) which the person derives from a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity. 92 Section 1962(b) prohibits the act of acquiring or
maintaining any interest in or control of an enterprise through
a pattern of racketeering activity. 93 Section 1962(c) prohibits the
act of conducting or participating in the affairs of the enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity, if the actor is em-
ployed by or associated with the enterprise.19
The concept of "enterprise," "pattern," and "injury by
reason of a violation" are discussed below. It is important to
realize that these concepts may be treated very differently under
the three different substantive liability subsections of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962.
1. Enterprise
i. Association in Fact
The RICO statute states that " 'enterprise' includes any
individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity."' 95 In United States v. Turkette,'9
the Supreme Court held that "associated in fact" means exactly
what it says. Specifically, it may include a "group of persons
associated together for a. common purpose of engaging in a
course of conduct."' 197 The phrase also includes "both legitimate
and illegitimate enterprises."' 98
Thus, in In re Gas Reclamation, Inc. Securities Litigation,'
the district court held that 1) the sellers of investment units in
a gas recovery and refrigeration plant (Gas Reclamation, Inc.),
combined with 2) other separate and distinct entities such as
banks, an insurance company, and an accounting firm (who
participated in the sale of the units but were completely separate
and distinct corporate entities) constituted an "enterprise" by
192 Id. at § 1962(a).
191 Id. at § 1962(b).
"' 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
,' Id. at § 1961(4).
452 U.S. 576 (1981).
I d. at 583.
' Id. at 585.
659 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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"association in fact." 2" The court rejected the banks' argument
that they were not "associated" with Gas Reclamation, Inc.
because 1) the association in fact was "continuing," and 2) the
acts (sale of "gas reclamation units") formed a "common pur-
pose," while the informal association between the parties con-
stituted an "enterprise." 20 1 In summation, the court adopted the
theory first advanced in United States v. Bagaric,2m which stated
that "it is logical to characterize any associative group in terms
of what it does, rather than by abstract analysis of its struc-
ture."203
Many courts loosely interpret the Turkette requirement that
an "enterprise must be an entity separate and apart from the
pattern of activity in which it engages. ' ' 204 For example, in Ocean
Energy II v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc.,2°s a RICO suit filed
against an insurer by an oilfield services company, the Fifth
Circuit held that the test is met if the plaintiff can show "con-
tinuity" of the enterprise. In other words, although "enterprise"
must be defined separately from "pattern of racketeering activ-
ity," the "ongoing nature" of a relationship formed for the
purpose of committing criminal acts is sufficient."
The Third Circuit has been less generous to plaintiffs. In
United States v. Riccobene,2°7 the court laid down three black-
letter requirements for proving the existence of an enterprise.
First, the plaintiff must meet the "ongoing organization" re-
quirement by showing "some sort of structure exists within the
group for the making of decisions .. .on an ongoing, rather
than an ad hoc, basis. '"2 Second, the individual members of
the enterprise must "function as [a] continuing unit" by per-
forming a role in the group that is consistent with "the organi-
zational structure established by the first element and which
furthers the activities of the organization.' '29 Finally, the Tur-
kette requirement of an "entity separate and apart from the
Id. at 515-16.
I' /d. at 516-517.
706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
' Id. at 56.
Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
-5 868 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1989).
1w Id. at 749.
21 709 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1983).
Im Id. at 222.
IN Id. at 223.
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pattern" was interpreted to require "an existence beyond that
which is necessary to commit each of the acts charged as pred-
icate racketeering offenses. 12 This interpretation seems unduly
restrictive in light of the United States Supreme Court's state-
ment in Turkette that proof of "enterprise" and "pattern" may
in fact coalesce. 21' Given this admonition, Turkette can be viewed
as a "pleadings" case which allows the same evidence to be used
to prove "enterprise" and "pattern", but requires that evidence
to be pled and considered separately.
By emphasizing organizational structure, the Eighth Circuit
appears to suggest-without admitting it-that only formal "or-
ganized crime" groups along the lines of La Cosa Nostra qualify
as "enterprises" under RICO. Turkette explicitly disavowed this
requirement in the context of enterprises.2 12 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has rejected the "organized crime" requirement
in other contexts as well. 213 Clearly, a RICO plaintiff is not
required to show an "organized crime" connection in order to
demonstrate "enterprise," "injury," or "pattern." Nor is it a
free-standing requirement of the Act. However, that is not to
say that it is totally irrelevant. In Beauford v. Helmsley,2 4 a
210 Id. at 224.
" Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
212 See supra text accompanying notes 196-198.
213 The Turkette holding was re-affirmed in Sedima v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S.
479 (1985). Sedima rejected a Second Circuit requirment of "racketeering injury"-that
the plaintiff must show some injury resulting directly from "racketeering." Although
the Second Circuit couched its opinion in terms of "standing" and "proximate cause,"
the Supreme Court explained that underlying the "Court of Appeals' holding was its
distress at the 'extraordinary, if not outrageous, uses to which civil RICO has been put.
[citation omitted] Instead of being used against mobsters and organized criminals, it has
become a tool for everyday fraud cases brought against 'respected and legitimate enter-
prises."' Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499. The Sedima court pointed out that although Congress
enacted RICO in response to the threat of organized crime, Congress itself was unable
to define "organized crime", and thus drafted the statute very broadly. Thus, Sedima
rejected an "organized crime" requirement in the context of injury.
Still, creative attorneys continued to attempt to insert an "organized crime" re-
quirement into RICO. The latest attempt occurred in the context of the pattern issue.
Proof of a "pattern of racketeering," (like proof of "enterprise") requires a showing
of the continuous nature of the acts committed. H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 109 S.Ct. 2893 (1989). Amici in this case argued that only
"organized-crime-type" perpetrators have the capacity to function as a continuous unit
over time, and therefore, proof of a "pattern" requires proof of an organized crime
connection. Northwestern Bell, 109 S.Ct. at 2902-3. Once more, the Court rejected any
such requirement as inconsistent with the language of the statute and Congressional
intent. Id. at 2903.
214 865 F.2d 1386 (2d Cir. 1989).
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RICO case involving fraudulent concealment of the presence of
asbestos in buildings, the Second Circuit explained that absent
an "organized crime" connection, the plaintiff's burden of prov-
ing the requisite "continuity" may be more difficult.
21 5
Another issue, related to "continuity", is also peculiar to
"associations in fact." Some courts have imposed the require-
ment that the defendant's predicate acts have a "nexus" to the
enterprise. 216 The court in Gas Reclamation explained this re-
quirement. The nexus exists when:
(1) one is enabled to commit the predicate offenses solely by
virtue of his position in the enterprise or involvement in or
control over the affairs of the enterprise, or
(2) the predicate offenses are related to the activities of the
enterprise. 217
Gas Reclamation held that the plaintiffs met their burden of
proving a "nexus", since the acts alleged as predicate offenses
(fraud in inducing the sale of gas reclamation units) also formed
the basis of the enterprise (an association in fact formed for the
purpose of defrauding the investors). 218 This analysis works well
for courts which accept the more lenient interpretation of "en-
terprise" based on its continuity. However, courts which look
to organizational structure to define "enterprise" and require
totally separate proof of "enterprise" and "pattern" would
likely find an absence of a "nexus" with any association in fact.
ii. A Comparison of Subsections 1962 (a), (b) and (c)
"Association in fact ' 219 is such an important concept for
RICO plaintiffs because of its application to subsection 1962(c).
"I Id. at 1391. The view is that the "threat of continuity [is] inherent in the
criminal nature of the enterprise." Id. Absent a showing of organized crime involvement,
"the nature of the enterprise does not of itself suggest that racketeering acts will continue,
and proof of continuity of racketeering activity must thus be found in some factor other
than the enterprise itself." Id.
Beauford considered the sufficiency of "continuity" in the context of "pattern"
rather than "enterprise." In fact, the court held that their analysis of continuity "has
shifted from the enterprise element to the pattern element." Id. at 1390. However, the
point of law is instructive for litigants in courts like the Eighth Circuit which emphasize
the "enterprise" element.
216 See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir. 1983).
I" Gas Reclamation, 659 F. Supp. at 517 (citing United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d
47, 54 (2d Cir. 1980)).
"I Id. Gas Reclamation, 659 F. Supp at 517.
219 See supra text accompanying notes 195-218.
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Superficially, it appears that a plaintiff could avoid the problems
associated with proving the existence of an "association in fact"
by alleging instead that the "enterprise" is a corporation.
220
Plaintiffs often allege that a corporation is both the "person"
(the defendant) and the "enterprise" in RICO actions. However,
one major line of cases holds that since section 1962(c) prohibits
a person from participating in the affairs of an enterprise through
a pattern of racketeering activity, the enterprise is viewed as the
victim of the racketeering. If a lawsuit names a corporation as
both the "person" and the "enterprise," the law would allow
punishment of the victim! On the other hand, according to
section 1962(a), if the person/enterprise is a corporation, it is
the beneficiary of the pattern of racketeering, and there is no
injustice in holding it liable. Many RICO actions involve viola-
tions of all three substantive subsections of section 1962. How-
ever, in the environmental context, it may be easier to prove
damages from a violation of subsection (c) than any other sub-
section. 22' The cases discussed below are helpful in understanding
the "person as the enterprise" problem.
Bennett v. United States Trust Co. of New York 222 estab-
lished the rule that under section 1962(c) a complaint must
"distinguish between the enterprise and the person conducting
the affairs of the enterprise in the prohibited manner.' '223 Citing
the Bennett rule favorably, Gas Reclamation held that the plain-
tiffs avoided the problem by alleging numerous individuals and
corporations as the "persons" to be held liable, and alleging
that the entire group (consisting of these same corporations and
individuals) existed as an "association in fact. '224
The district court in Garbade v. Great Divide Mining &
Milling Corp. ,225 held that a section 1962(c) action against Great
Divide which named the corporation as both the "person" to
be held liable and as the "enterprise" must fail. The court
reasoned that since the proscription in section 1962(c) "only
I" Recall that 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) defines "enterprise" as not only "associations
in fact," but also includes partnerships, corporations, and other legal entities.
12' This author agrees that it may be more difficult, but disagrees with the premise
that the law should require it to be more difficult. See infra text accompanying notes
358-365.
770 F.2d 308, 315 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986).
223 Id.
I2 Gas Reclamation, 659 F. Supp at 517-518.
22$ 645 F. Supp. 808 (D. Colo. 1986).
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runs to those employed by or associated with an enterprise
... [a] corporation such as Great Divide 'cannot logically be
employed by or associate with itself."' 26 The court stated that
the same analysis would hold under section 1962(a), but failed
to explain how. 227 As the cases below show, compelling reasons
exist for treating these two sections differently.
Long Island Lighting Co. v. General Electric Co. 8 involved
a section 1962(a) action. The plaintiff, a public utility, sued
General Electric for "misrepresentations and non-disclosures re-
garding the safety, reliability and licensability" of a pressure
containment system for a nuclear power plant.229 The plaintiff
alleged that these misrepresentations were predicate acts of mail
and wire fraud which constituted a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity, and further alleged that General Electric violated section
1962(a) by investing in itself the proceeds derived from that
pattern of racketeering activity. 2 0 General Electric argued that
section 1962(a) only prohibits investment of racketeering pro-
ceeds in an "entity separate from the defendant itself.' '231 The
court recognized such a "separate entity" requirement for sec-
tion 1962(c), but rejected its applicability to section 1962(a),
noting that this distinction is followed by numerous courts in
many circuits.
232
Finally, the district court in Waste Conversion, Inc. v. Rol-
lins Environmental Services, Inc.233 explained the "separate en-
tity" issue in the context of a hazardous waste/RICO action.
The plaintiff, a waste hauler, alleged that the defendant fraud-
ulently represented that its waste "could be disposed of as non-
hazardous, when in fact, under government regulations, it had
to be disposed of as hazardous. ' 234 The plaintiff alleged that the
misrepresentation amounted to a pattern of racketeering activity
based on mail and wire fraud, and claimed damage under sec-
tions 1962(a) and (c).235 The court dismissed both counts on
226 Id. at 811 (quoting Saine v. A.I.A., 582 F. Supp. 1299, 1307 (D. Colo.)).
2 Id. at 811 n.6.
712 F. Supp. 292 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
22 Id. at 294.
M Id. at 296.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 297.
33 No. 88-7792, 1989 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8054 (E.D. Pa. July 7, 1989).
234 Id. at 2.
233 Id. at 4.
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other grounds, but in dicta, it recognized the distinction between
the two sections. Under section 1962(a), the court explained, "a
corporation ...that allegedly engages in racketeering activities
and is also allegedly the beneficiary of those activities can be
both the 'person' and the 'enterprise.' ' ' 236 However, under sec-
tion 1962(c), the court said, "the 'person' and the 'enterprise'
must be different, because an enterprise cannot logically be said
to 'participate' in its own affairs."
'237
The concept of separate entity may also arise under section
1962(b), which has been described as "sort of a hybrid between
subsection (a) and subsection (c). ' 238 This section, which prohib-
its the use of a pattern of racketeering to acquire any interest
in an enterprise, has not been litigated as frequently in the
context of civil RICO as have other substantive subsections.
Perhaps this is because the acts to which it seems to be directed
relate to traditional "organized crime" activity, rather than
"business frauds. ' 239 This is not to say that section 1962(b)
imposes an "organized crime" requirement. In a practical sense,
it is difficult to imagine any form of activity not completely
covered by subsections (a) and (c). Nevertheless, one court that
considered the "separate entity" issue concluded that "like sub-
section (a), subsection (b) does not require the existence of an
enterprise separate and distinct from the person sought to be
held liable."
iii. Affecting Commerce
Each of the three substantive subsections of section 1962
discussed above, and the conspiracy subsection, 24' require proof
that the enterprise is "engaged in" or its activities "affect"
interstate or foreign commerce. 242 Providing the requisite proof
should not be a difficult hurdle for the plaintiff as the term
"affecting commerce" represents the fullest jurisdictional
breadth constitutionally permissible under the Commerce
3' Id. (citing Patco-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of North America, 824 F.2d 1349,
1360 (3d Cit. 1987)).
I2 d. (citing Hirsch v. Enright Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628, 633-34 (3d Cir. 1984)).
2M Smith, supra note 75, at § 6.02(c).
139 On its face, the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) appears to be directed toward
"protection" or "insurance" rackets involving extortion.
m Liquid Air Corp. v. Rodgers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1307 (7th Cir. 1987).
14, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
-2 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d).
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Clause.243 For example, in United States v. Barton,-" the Second
Circuit considered whether the activities of defendants (who were
charged with bombing a university building and a car) affected
commerce. Evidence was presented which showed that natural
gas used to heat the building originated out-of-state, and that
the vehicle was insured by an interstate carrier 35 The court
found this interstate connection adequate.
24
6
Although proving that an enterprise "affects commerce"
should not be difficult, it is an essential element of a RICO
case, as well as a jurisdictional requirement. Therefore, adequate
evidence of interstate commerce connections must be presented
by the plaintiff.
2. Pattern of Racketeering
RICO states that a "'pattern of racketeering activity' requires
at least two acts of racketeering activity. . . .,"'4 Emphasizing
the "at least" language, the United States Supreme Court
explained that a "pattern" requires more than "proof of simply
two predicates. . . ."2" This judicial gloss upon the statute now
requires proof that 1) the predicate acts are "related," and 2)
the predicate acts "amount to or pose a threat of continued
criminal activity." 49 These concepts are explored in greater detail
below.
i. Acts of Mail or Wire Fraud as a Pattern
Clearly, "each separate use of the interstate mails or wires
in furtherance of a scheme to defraud constitutes a separate
crime under the mail and wire fraud statutes.' 2 0 In D'Allessan-
z, NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963).
647 F.2d 224 (2d Cir. 1981).
', Id. at 232. It was also shown that food, such as coffee and orange juice, which
originated out-of-state, was served in the building. Id.
2 4 Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
'8 H. J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. at
2899 (1989).
149 Id. at 2900. "It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to
produce a pattern." Id. (citing S. REP. No. 91-617, at 158 (1969)).
2" Gas Reclamation, 659 F. Supp. at 513 (citing United States v. Blankenship, 746
F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1984), reh'g denied (en banc), 750 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1984), and United
States v. Hewes, 729 F.2d 1302 (11th Cir. 1984), reh'g denied (en banc), 734 F.2d 1481
(11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1110 (1985)).
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dro v. City Federal Savings & Loan,2 ' the District Court applied
this rule to a civil RICO action which alleged that on two or
more occasions, the defendants committed acts of mail or wire
fraud in furtherance of a conspiracy to induce purchases of
uninhabitable properties in the vicinity of a toxic landfill.2 12 The
court noted that in the criminal context, each mailing is a
separate offense of mail fraud, and held that the plaintiff had
thus adequately alleged the predicate acts.253
ii. Related Predicate Acts
In Northwestern Bell, the Supreme Court held that in order
to constitute a "pattern," the predicate acts must be sufficiently
"related" to each other.254 Acts are "related" if they "have the
same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or meth-
ods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguish-
ing characteristics and are not isolated events.' '255
The district court in Long Island Lighting256 considered the
"relatedness" issue in the context of a lawsuit alleging mail and
wire fraud acts committed by General Electric Company for the
purpose of misrepresenting the safety, reliability, and licensabil-
ity of a nuclear power plant containment system. 2 7 The court's
test looked at the ultimate goal of the predicate acts. The court
held that the numerous acts "are related in that they all refer
to GE's alleged cover-up of problems with hydrodynamic
forces.' '258
The Beauford case, 259 on the other hand, looked at the
relatedness of the intended victims, in addition to asking whether
the ultimate goals of each predicate act were related. The Beau-
ford plaintiffs alleged that the defendants committed thousands
of mail frauds in connection with a scheme to sell buildings
" Nos. 84-2407(SSB), 85-1615(SSB), 84-2557(SSB), 85-1614(SSB), 84-2589(SSB)
and 85-1612(SSB), 1987 WL 49414 (D.N.J. Sept. 1, 1987).
2 Id. at 1, 2 and 6.
Id. at 5, 6.
114 See supra notes 237-239 and accompanying text.
255 H. J., Inc. v Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. at
2901 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)).
256 Long Island Lighting, 712 F. Supp. at 292.
7 Id. at 296.
25M Id. at 298.
9 Beauford v. Helmsley, 865 F.2d 1386 (2d Cir. 1989).
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contaminated with asbestos. 260 In holding the acts were "re-
lated," the court said:
All of the mailings were made to groups of persons related by
either their tenancy in Parkchester apartments or their potential
interest in purchasing such apartments. All of the frauds alleg-
edly had the same goal, i.e., inflating the profits to be made
by the defendants in the sale of the Parkchester apartments. 26'
Obviously, whether a given set of predicate acts is "related"
depends upon which of the several Northwestern Bell factors
262
a court chooses to rely. It also depends upon how broadly each
particular factor is defined.
Consider a hypothetical situation involving an operator of
hazardous waste disposal sites. 26 Suppose the operator commit-
ted numerous acts of mail and wire fraud against different
government agencies by fraudulently concealing waste disposal
violations. These violations occurred at seven different sites.
Furthermore, assume that the operation committed only one act
of mail fraud in fraudulently concealing the violations from a
purchaser of one of the sites. Here, numerous government agen-
cies are victims of separate acts of mail fraud. The purchaser is
the victim of one act. Now, assume the purchaser files a RICO
action against the seller-operator, and attempts to prove "relat-
edness" of the acts in order to establish the requisite "pattern
of racketeering activity." The defendant (the seller-operator)
argues that no pattern is established because the victims are
unrelated. Furthermore, the frauds involved sites unrelated to
the one the purchaser-plaintiff acquired. The plaintiff, on the
other hand, would argue "relatedness" of the purpose and the
result of the frauds. The purpose of the scheme was to avoid
liability to government agencies and a private party purchaser
by concealing toxic contamination. The result was to defraud
the government and the private party purchaser of knowledge
to which they were entitled; i.e., the right to be aware of the
existence of chemical contamination.
Id. at 1392.
261 Id.
'a See supra text accompanying note 255.
This hypothetical is loosely based upon the facts of the Huntsman-Christensen
case, supra text accompanying note 168-173. The facts and issues have been modified
for the purpose of the hypothetical.
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In this hypothetical, a broad view of "relatedness" would
look at the totality of the factors: victims, purpose, results,
methods of commission, participants, and other considerations.
A narrow view would hold that the acts are unrelated unless
each factor shows relatedness. Similarly, a broad view would
look for commonalities within each individual factor. For ex-
ample, if the hypothetical above involved victims which were
separate agencies of federal, state, and local governments, the
broad view would say the victims were related because they were
all government agencies. The narrow view would hold that the
victims were unrelated because they were from different agencies
and different levels of government. "Relatedness" is obviously
a fluid concept. Northwestern Bell strongly suggests that the
"broad view" is the correct approach.
2
6
One final point should be noted with respect to "related-
ness." In the hypothetical above, the plaintiff alleged that only
one act of mail fraud was committed- directly against himself.
The other acts were committed "against" various government
entities, none of which were parties to the civil RICO litigation.
If providing existence of a "pattern" is dependent upon showing
that the plaintiff is the intended target of the predicate acts,
then the hypothetical plaintiff above loses, because he does not
even meet RICO's statutory requirement of alleging "at least
two acts."2 5 Of course, in a criminal prosecution for mail fraud,
it is not necessary for the government to prove that the victim
is the intended target. 26 But the hypothetical goes one step
further: not only is the plaintiff not the "intended target" of
In Northwestern Bell, the Supreme Court borrowed the "relatedness" factors
from Title X of the Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-et.
seq., - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. at 2901. The statutory language of this section reads
in the disjunctive, i.e., "same or similar purposes . . .or otherwise are interrelated ...
and are not isolated events." 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e). The language suggests that viewing
the totality of the factors may even be too narrow a test; use of the disjunctive "or"
implies that any one factor may meet the test for relatedness.
Further, the Court pointed out that "Congress drafted RICO broadly enough to
encompass a wide range of criminal activity ... [and that it would be counterproductive
and a mismeasure of congressional intent now to adopt a narrow construction of the
statute's pattern element . .. ." - U.S. - , 109 S.Ct. at 2905. Although this
statement was made in response to a proposal by amici to incorporate an "organized
crime connection" requirement into the test for "pattern," it is indicative of the Court's
liberal approach which began with Sedima, 473 U.S. 479 (1985), and has continued to
date.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
"6 See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
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the fraud against the government-he arguably cannot even be
classified as a "victim." Assuming he is not a victim, should he
have standing to assert that frauds against the government form
part of the "pattern" he must prove to win his case?
The district court in Case v. Dillier 67 considered a similar
question. There, the plaintiffs alleged the defendants committed
numerous acts of mail and wire fraud when they fraudulently
represented to a government agency that they were in compliance
with state oil and gas regulations. 268 To complicate matters, the
misrepresentations concerned four different oil wells-only one
in which the plaintiff alleged a property interest. 269 The court
held that the "fact that plaintiffs have an interest solely in
the.... [one] well operates as a limitation on the amount of
their recovery. It does not, however, operate as a limitation on
plaintiff's standing to bring a private RICO action. '270 The court
held that the plaintiff's allegations concerning fraudulent acts
connected with wells in which they had no interest were relevant
to the complaint, and allowed the plaintiff to use such allegations
to prove existence of a "pattern.1 27' In essence, without stating
it explicitly, the Dillier court held that the plaintiff could prove
relatedness by showing similar methods of commission and sim-
ilar participants. The unrelated nature of the intended victims,
or even the actual victims, was irrelevant, as the court used the
"broader" approach to define relatedness.
272
iii. Continuity
Continuity is "centrally a temporal concept, ' 273 and it must
be proved in addition to relatedness in order to show the exis-
tence of a pattern. 274 The reason Congress required continuity
and relationship was to avoid subjecting a person to the severe
sanctions of RICO "simply for committing two widely separated
16 No. IP 85-436-C, 1986 WL 22213, RICO Bus. Disp. Guide (CCH) 6486 (S.D.
Ind., Nov. 7, 1986).
2 Id. at 1.
6 Id.
270 Id. at 3.
271 Id. at 4.
"I See supra notes 263-264 and accompanying text.
273 Northwestern Bell, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. at 2902.
274 Id.
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and isolated criminal offenses.''275 Predicate acts which extend
over "only a few months" and present no threat of recurrence
in the future do not satisfy the requirement for continuity.
276
Before the Supreme Court decided Northwestern Bell, 277 sev-
eral courts imposed strict requirements on the continuity con-
cept. These courts required the plaintiff to allege the existence
of separate "schemes," "episodes," or "transactions" involving
the predicate acts. Like the elusive "organized crime connection"
requirement, many cases do not specifically indicate where or
how this requirement fits into proof of a "pattern. ' 278 It is
unclear whether this requirement was some sort of free-standing
prerequisite to proving the existence of a "pattern" in general,
or whether it was only necessary to prove the existence of the
"continuity" aspect of the "pattern." The Huntsman-Christen-
sen court279 held the requirement was necessary to prove the
"continuity" aspect of the pattern.m
The plaintiff who must prove the existence of two separate
schemes is faced with two major problems. First, the process of
deciding whether certain predicate acts constitute a "separate"
scheme from others is inherently subjective. For example, Hunts-
man-Christensen considered eight acts of mail and wire fraud
directed at the same governmental entities, but the acts involved
numerous hazardous waste sites.28' The court said, "it is artificial
to carve that singular criminal episode into multiple episodes
upon the basis of property location," and dismissed the plain-
tiff's claims "for failure to plead a 'pattern. '282 The court
275 Id. (citing S. REP. No. 91-617, p. 158 (1969)).
26 Northwestern Bell, - U.S. _, 109 S.Ct. at 2902.
"7 H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
27 See, e.g., Garbade v. Great Divide Min. & Mill. Corp., 645 F. Supp. 808 (D.
Colo. 1986). The Garbade court said that although the plaintiff alleged "several"
predicate acts of mail fraud, "because the acts are only directed toward a single
fraudulent scheme, they do not constitute a pattern of racketeering activity." Id. at 815.
Although the court cited numerous cases imposing this requirement, it never explained
whether proof of multiple schemes should be offered to show "relatedness," "pattern,"
or whether it simply advanced the court's notion of the purposes of RICO.
" Huntsman-Christensen Corp. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., No. C86-530G, slip
op. at 21 (C.D. Utah, Nov. 24, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
- Id. The court cited with approval the holding in Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare,
N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828, 832 (N.D. Ill. 1985): "It is difficult to see how
the threat of continuing activity stressed in the Senate Report could be established by a





justified this holding by pointing out that all eight acts were
"directed at the same governmental entities" and had a "sin-
gular purpose to conceal the true condition of the properties. "283
The court's characterization is itself "artificial." Another view
could just as easily hold that the defendants had multiple "pur-
poses" and targets. These purposes might include 1) concealing
the contamination from all government agencies involved, 2)
concealing the contamination from each government agency, 3)
concealing the contamination from the public, and 4) concealing
the contamination from the plaintiffs in this case. Furthermore,
the court fails to explain why it is "artificial" to define "epi-
sode" based on property location.
The second problem with requiring multiple "schemes, epi-
sodes or transactions" to prove continuity is that proving con-
tinuity in this manner actually disproves "relatedness." In United
States v. Horak,28 the alleged pattern consisted of three bribes
of government officials for the purpose of securing garbage
disposal contracts. 28 The defendant attempted to characterize
these acts as a "single scheme to win [a particular] contract.' '286
The court responded that even if the three bribes constituted a
single scheme, that was sufficient to prove existence of a pattern.
The court said:
We have held that to require predicate acts always occur as
parts of separate schemes in order to satisfy the continuity
prong would effectively negate the relationship prong and al-
low defendants who participated in one massive ongoing scheme
to escape RICO liability.
287
Other courts, including ones considering the problem in the
context of environmental and natural resources cases,288 began
to accept proof of a single scheme as RICO case law began to
fully develop. Finally, the Supreme Court held once and for all
that separate schemes are not required to prove existence of a
283 Id.
n4 833 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1987).
"I Id. at 1240.
n6 Id.
n' Id.
"' See, e.g., 659 F. Supp. at 514; see also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d
1271, 1279 (7th Cir. 1989); Beauford v. Helmsley, 865 F.2d 1386, 1387 (2d Cir. 1989).
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pattern. 2 9 Thus, it is no longer true, as one author asserted in
1987, that "predicate acts must be related, but they cannot be
related too closely lest they be said to be a single 'package' or
single transaction ... .
The Supreme Court also noted that another common prob-
lem exists for the RICO plaintiff who attempts to prove conti-
nuity. It is often necessary for a plaintiff to bring an action
before it can be shown that the "series of related predicates"
extend over a "substantial" period of time.29' If the acts have
not occurred over a substantial period of time, however, the
plaintiff may demonstrate continuity by establishing a threat
that they will continue to occur in the future. 292 Thus, the
Beaufor 2 93 court held that where there was reason to believe
the defendants (who were accused of mailing thousands of doc-
uments which fraudulently concealed the presence of asbestos in
buildings for sale) might continue to mail similar documents
"over an additional period of years," a sufficient showing of
continuity had been made. 294 The likelihood of future mailings
was evident from the fact that forty percent of the asbestos-
contaminated apartments remained unsold.
295
In Northwestern Bell, the Supreme Court pointed out that
the threat of future criminal activity could be shown in a number
of ways. First, the defendant may make a "specific threat" to
continue the activity. 296 Second, the predicate acts may be "part
of an ongoing entity's regular way of doing business. ' ' 29 This is
evident if the defendant operates as "part of a long-term asso-
ciation that exists for criminal purposes," but the Court was
quick to explain that this does not require proof that the defen-
- Northwestern Bell, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. at 2893. The Court said, "We
find no support in those sources for the proposition, espoused by The Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit in this case, that predicate acts of racketeering may form a pattern
only when they are part of separate illegal schemes." Id. at -.
2' Smith, supra note 75 at § 6.0313][b].
'9' Northwestern Bell, -- U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. at 2902. The Court said that
predicate acts which extend "over a few weeks or months" do not extend over a
"substantial" period of time when there is no separate showing of a threat that the acts
will continue to occur in the future. Id.
9 Id.
191 Beauford v. Helmsley, 865 F.2d 1386 (2d. Cir. 1989).
29' Id. at 1392.
,9, Id.




dants are part of "organized crime." 298 Finally, the Court warned
that the "precise methods" by which "continuity or its threat
may be proved, cannot be fixed in advance with such clarity
that it will always be apparent whether in a particular case a
'pattern of racketeering activity' exists." 2  The Court has clearly
adopted a broad view of the "pattern" concept-in terms of
both the "relatedness" and the "continuity" requirements. Many
environmental/natural resources RICO actions which were dis-
missed five years ago would now survive an attack for failure
to allege a "pattern" under today's more liberal standards.
3. Injury and Causation
RICO provides a private cause of action, with recovery of
attorney's fees and treble damages, for any "person injured in
his business or property by reason of a violation of § 1962.
• . .- 300 Two issues are relevant to a discussion of this section.
First, what type of causal link is required between the violation
and the injury? Second, what type of injury is compensable?
i. Causation
a. Introduction to Causation
The plaintiff in a traditional toxic tort suit has "difficulty
meeting the civil burden of proof because injuries caused by
toxic waste, like cancer or genetic damage, are of indeterminate
causation. "301 One commentator optimistically suggested that a
toxic waste victim suing under RICO "should not encounter
causative difficulty in establishing business or property injury
.... ,,302 This commentator acknowledged the difficulty in prov-
ing personal injury causation, but professed that a plaintiff "will
have no problem in establishing harm to his business or prop-
'" Id. The "organized crime" requirement has also been rejected in the context of
the "enterprise" element. See supra notes 212-215 and accompanying text.
29Id.
_ 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
3" Note, The Applicability of Civil RICO to Toxic Waste Polluters, 62 IND. L.J.
451, 453 (1987). This commentator notes that a plaintiff may "show a correlation
between an increase in the occurrence of a disease in a population exposed to a toxic
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erty." 03 Clearly, the cases to date show that this position is
incorrect. First, the issue of causation should not be confused
with the issue of recoverable damages.3 4 Second, courts have
tended-rightly or wrongly-to impose strict requirements of
proximate cause in toxic waste/RICO cases.305
The United States Supreme Court has observed that the
RICO causation requirement can be viewed as "an aspect of
standing.63 However, it is important to distinguish between
"RICO standing" -which is met if the plaintiff shows injury
"by reason of a violation of § 1962"-and traditional non-
RICO standing requirements. Furthermore, environmental/nat-
ural resources RICO cases involving mail or wire fraud as pred-
icate offenses should be broken down into two separate categories
for purposes of RICO standing. One category involves situations
where the defendant perpetrates a fraud directly upon the plain-
tiff. In that case, it is relatively easy for a plaintiff to prove
RICO standing. The other category involves situations where the
defendant perpetrates the fraud upon some third party. There,
a plaintiff may find it very difficult to assert RICO standing. In
other words, courts may find that the plaintiff has suffered no
injury "by reason of" a RICO violation. To further complicate
matters, a plaintiff's RICO standing may depend upon which
substantive RICO violation is alleged in the complaint.3 7 These
issues are discussed below.
b. Non-RICO Standing
Some cases discuss "standing" without differentiating be-
tween traditional requirements which apply to all civil damages
actions, as opposed to special RICO requirements. The cases in
this subsection concern traditional standing requirements ("non-
RICO standing") which may be present in environmental/natu-
ral resources RICO actions.
-0 Id. The author explained that it "may be impossible to determine which indi-
viduals did or did not contract cancer from exposure to a defendant's chemicals, but by
performing a few tests, it is relatively easy to determine whose land or farm animals
have accumulated hazardous waste." Id. at n.192.
- The issue of what sort of damages are recoverable is discussed infra, at notes
388-392 and accompanying text.
-' See infra notes 345-357 and accompanying text.
Gas Reclamation, 663 F. Supp. at 1125 (making reference to Sedima, S.P.R.L.
v. Imrex Co. 473 U.S. 479, 496-7 (1989)).
Specifically, plaintiff's RICO standing may depend upon whether plaintiff's
injury is "by reason of" section 1962(a), (b), or (c).
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The district court in Ocean Energy ipos described three types
of situations where non-RICO standing requirements may be-
come relevant to RICO actions. First, some courts have held
that shareholders in a corporation "may not bring a RICO
action where the racketeering activity was directed against the
corporation, where the injury to the shareholders merely derived
from and thus was not distinct from the injury to the corpora-
tion, and where state law provided that the sole cause of action
accrued to the corporation. ' ' 309 These are known as "derivative
claims.' '310 Second, plaintiffs in "actions analogous to derivative
suits" may lack standing to claim injuries.31' An example might
include an action by union members, where the members in a
labor union could properly be analogized to shareholders in a
corporation. 3 2 Finally, bankruptcy proceedings may involve
standing issues. In a bankruptcy proceeding, only the bankruptcy
trustee-not the individual creditors-'"has standing to recover
property belonging to the estate. ' ' 31 3 Thus an employee may lack
standing to bring a RICO claim where the claim is based on
misrepresentations "made to the corporation. ' 314 Although this
list is not exhaustive of all non-RICO standing requirements it
provides an understandable breakdown of what some courts
mean when they distinguish between "direct" and "indirect"
injuries in RICO actions.315 The Ocean Energy H court said that
the "direct/indirect distinction has been employed as a short-
hand means of describing which of related persons may bring
suit for injuries.
31 6
The facts and pleadings in Ocean Energy II lend even more
meaning to the distinction.31 7 The plaintiff (a company engaged
- Ocean Energy II v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 868 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1989).
-" Id.
310 Id.
"I Id. at 745.
312 Id.
3'1 Id. Caveat: this standing rule apparently does not apply where the creditor
brings a RICO action based upon misrepresentations that were "directed to the creditor
to induce its confirmation of a reorganization plan." Id. at 746 (citing Bankers Trust
Corp. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988)).
114 Ocean Energy II, 868 F.2d at 746.
3 Id. at 746.
6 d. at 744.
" The facts, as set forth in the text above, may be found at Ocean Energy II, 868
F.2d at 741-42.
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in the oilfield business) purchased insurance coverage through a
jocal agent. The policy was issued by the Transit Casualty Com-
pany ("Transit"). After the policy was issued, Transit was de-
clared insolvent by a state court, and claims which the plaintiff
had submitted to Transit went unpaid. The plaintiff named the
local agent as a RICO defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the
agent engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity through the
use of a rate structure which violated numerous state insurance
regulations, and constituted mail fraud. The court assumed ar-
guendo that a pattern of racketeering existed for purposes of
considering the standing issues." ' The court's ruling is an excel-
lent example of how the form of pleadings can affect the exis-
tence of non-RICO standing.
The plaintiff's first claim alleged that by selling Transit
policies at illegally low rates, the local agent defrauded Transit
of premiums, and this in turn contributed to Transit's insol-
vency, and the insolvency rendered the plaintiff's policy worth-
less. The court held that the difference between the illegal low
rates and the rates which should have been charged was property
of the bankrupt Transit estate. This was a claim "for damages
arising from fraud perpetuated on Transit," and only the bank-
ruptcy trustee had standing to bring a RICO claim for this
money.1
9
The plaintiff's second claim, however, alleged that "but for
the use of illegal inducements and unfair competitive practices
by the Defendants in selling this program to the Plaintiffs, they
would not have been insured by Transit and would not have
been affected by its demise for those reasons. ' 320 Since the
plaintiff was the "target and victim" of the scheme-as opposed
to suffering derivatively from frauds perpetrated on others-
then only the plaintiff had standing to assert this claim. 32' For
the first claim, the derivative damages were measured by the
difference between the illegal premium rate and the legal rate,
and were properly characterized as property of the bankrupt
estate. Allowable damages for the second claim, however, in-
cluded the plaintiff's litigation costs incurred in defending claims
brought against it by accident victims, money paid to those
"I Id. at 746.
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 Id. at 747.
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victims, loss of good will, and other damage to plaintiff's busi-
ness.3
22
The test for non-RICO standing requires the plaintiff to
"demonstrate (1) a distinct and palpable injury, (2) which injury
is a result of the defendant's alleged illegal act, and (3) which
will be likely redressed by the requested relief.' '323 Traditional
standing limitations simply prohibit the plaintiff from claiming
injuries suffered by others. 324 The issue arises frequently in en-
vironmental/natural resources cases, and often appears in cases
under the rubric of "direct/indirect injury. ' 32 Perhaps the best
way to distinguish between traditional standing and RICO stand-
ing is to ask whether the plaintiff's particular claim for damages
322 Id. at 746-47.
323 Dart Construction Co. v. Marriott Corp., No. 88-6169, slip op. at 8 (Feb. 7,
1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file) (citing Matter of Appointment of Independent
Counsel, 766 F.2d 70, 73-74 (2d Cir. 1985)).
32 A simple example of this truism is seen in the Dart Construction case, see supra
notes 161-167 and accompanying text, where the plaintiff landfill operator (Dart Con-
struction Company, Inc.) was not incorporated until after the date of the occurrence of
the acts giving rise to damages. The injured party was actually "D.A.R.T. Construction
Corporation", which was incorporated before the date of these acts. The court said it
was "apparent" that the plaintiff Dart Construction Company, Inc. had no standing to
sue. Frank Sacco, the principal of both corporations, asked for permission to substitute
"D.A.R.T." as the plaintiff, and the court granted leave to amend the complaint. Dart
Construction, No. 88-6169, slip op. at 8.
"3 To add to the confusion, many courts also use the "direct/indirect" injury
language when discussing RICO standing, i.e., when deciding whether the plaintiff's
injuries were "by reason of" the defendant's conduct. See, e.g., Morast v. Lance, 807
F.2d 926 (11 th Cir. 1987). Morast involved a RICO claim by an employee of a bank
who alleged that his employer engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity, and fired
him in retaliation for reporting the predicate acts to the authorities. Id. at 929. The
court denied recovery for lost wages, stating that the plaintiff's injury "did not flow
directly from the predicate acts." Id. at 933. Even though this court used the "direct"
injury language, the decision had nothing at all to do with non-RICO standing require-
ments. In fact, the court was looking at whether the defendant was injured "by reason
of" the predicate acts-a RICO standing issue.
See also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271, 1280 (7th Cir. 1989), where
in the bankruptcy context, the court held the plaintiff's injury was "direct" and the
plaintiff had "standing" because:
Here, the plaintiffs have shown injury distinct from that of other creditors.
Although a part of the underlying scheme was the diversion of corporate
assets .... an essential part of the scheme, on which its success depended,
was the fraudulent taking from the plaintiffs of exceptionally large quan-
tities of fuel. We conclude that the facts show an injury to the plaintiffs
significantly different from the injuries to creditors in general ... "
Id.
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is properly subsumed within some other party's claim. In other
words, if the third party's potential claim encompasses the RICO
plaintiff's claim, then the individual RICO plaintiff may have
traditional standing problems. An example is a derivative suit
by a shareholder in a corporation against a debtor of the cor-
poration. If the corporation has five shareholders, each holding
20 percent of the outstanding shares, then one shareholder might
try to sue the corporation's debtor for 20 percent of the debt
owed- claiming that the value of his shares had been reduced
by exactly that amount. The corporation may sue for 100 percent
of the debt. If both the shareholder and the corporation sue for
the debt, the debtor is never liable for more than 100 percent
of the debt. The shareholder may lack non-RICO standing to
sue the debtor.
If the plaintiff's claim is separate and apart from, and can
rightly be viewed as recoverable in addition to the corporation's
claim, then the plaintiff would encounter no traditional standing
problems. However, the plaintiff must still show injury "by
reason of" the RICO violation.
As Ocean Energy II points out, the plaintiff may be able to
avoid standing problems through careful drafting of claims for
relief.
c. RICO Standing: Fraud Directed at the Plaintiff
The United States Supreme Court held in Sedima that RI-
CO's "by reason of" language imposes a standing requirement.
The plaintiff has RICO standing only if "he has been injured
in his business or property by the conduct constituting the vio-
lation. 3 26 In other words, a "defendant who violates § 1962 is
not liable for treble damages to everyone he might have injured
by other conduct, nor is the defendant liable to those who have
not been injured.''327 Without this causation requirement, a de-
fendant might be liable to every citizen who could prove in a
civil RICO action that the defendant violated section 1962(a),
(b), (c) or (d). This would obviously make no sense.
Where fraudulent acts are directed toward the RICO plaintiff
in particular, i.e.,-where the plaintiff himself is the "target" of
2 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496.
"I Id. at 496-97 (citing Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of
Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd. 473 U.S. 606 (1985)).
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the predicate acts of mail or wire fraud, proof of causation
should not be difficult. In the Gas Reclamation case a2 for
example, investor-plaintiffs "frame[d] a picture of falsely posi-
tive factual representations about the merits and track record of
the gas reclamation program, which when communicated in the
context of a packaged investment offering .... induced them
to invest. ' a29 The court held that with the exception of one
defendant (an accounting firm), the plaintiffs met their burden
of pleading causation.3 0 This is straightforward, factual, "but-
for" causation: but for the fraudulent representations, the plain-
tiffs would not have invested, and would not have lost their
money.
In addition to factual causation, some courts have required
a showing of proximate cause.33" ' Unlike the cases discussed in
subsection (d) of this Note (dealing with fraud directed at third
parties), a showing of proximate causation is virtually inherent
in a showing that the RICO plaintiff was the intended victim of
the defendant's fraudulent acts. In other words, it is "reasonably
foreseeable" that the injuries will result from fraud directed at
the plaintiff.
33 2
However, proximate cause has aspects beyond foreseeability,
and these other aspects may prevent recovery in an environmen-
tal/natural resources RICO action. For instance, the District
Court in Waste Conversion v. Rollins Environmental Services
(NJ), Inc.333 granted the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment because the plaintiff's "own wrongful conduct actively
operated in producing the harm of which [the plaintiff com-
plains] . . . and that . . . [the plaintiff] could have avoided the
harm by the use of reasonable effort .... -334
The plaintiff, a waste hauler, alleged injury by reason of
misrepresentations concerning the toxicity level of the defen-
Gas Reclamation, 659 F. Supp. at 493.
' Id. at 512.
3" Id. at 518.
"I See, e.g., Ocean Energy 11, 868 F.2d at 744 (holding that the "by reason of"
language requires proof of "(1) factual (but for) causation and (2) legal (proximate)
causation of the alleged injury)."
112 See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). Here, as
the plaintiff stood on a railroad station platform, she was hurt by a set of scales that
fell as a result of an explosion, which occurred when a passenger dropped fireworks
when pushed into the train by a railroad employee. The court said the railroad could
not be held liable for such an unforseeable act. Id. at 99-100.
"I No. 88-7792, 1989 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8054 (E.D. Pa. July 7, 1989).
, Id. at 25.
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dant's waste. 35 These misrepresentations, which occurred in the
form of "submission of inaccurate manifests" to the plaintiff,
were a "but for" cause of the plaintiff's injuries. But for the
inaccurate manifests, the plaintiff could not have improperly
disposed of the waste.3 36 Thus, the plaintiff would not have been
forced to spend money defending an action brought by the state
of New Jersey for illegal disposal of hazardous wastes. However,
the court found that the plaintiff knew that the defendant's
waste was "hazardous" and knew that "it had to be disposed
of as hazardous, no matter how it may have been coded [on the
manifests] . . . ,,337 Therefore, the plaintiff's own conduct was
viewed as an "intervening force" which cut off proximate cau-
sation.
338
d. RICO Standing: Fraud Directed at Third Parties
The Supreme Court has not yet clearly ruled on the question
of whether RICO requires a showing of proximate cause. Not
all courts require proximate cause to show RICO standing. 339
The foreseeability aspect of proximate cause is a fluid concept
which necessarily involves policy judgments. 340 Therefore, courts
which impose a proximate cause requirement as an aspect of
RICO standing may have widely divergent opinions with respect
to the requisite causal nexus. 34' In RICO actions based on pred-
"I Id. at 2. The "injury" alleged to have been sustained was payment of legal fees
in defending an action brought against this plaintiff by the State of New Jersey for
improperly disposing of hazardous wastes in a landfill. Id. at 3.
SId. at 25 (The landfill would not have accepted the wastes had the manifests
been labeled as "hazardous.").
- Id. at 9.
SId. at 23, referring to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, at §§ 440-42. Alterna-
tively, the court said that:
under the doctrine of avoidable consequences, even if the defendant in-
tended the harm to the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot recover if he knew
of the danger of the harm, could have avoided that harm by the use of
reasonable effort, and intentionally or heedlessly failed to protect his
interests.
Id. at 24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, at § 918.
,19 See, e.g., Bankers Trust v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that
"by reason of" language only requires "but for" causation).
' See Law of Hazardous Waste, supra note 31, at § 17.02[l]: "Proximate causation
is often defined in terms of foreseeability, and in essence represents a policy judgment
about the extent to which a defendant should be held liable for the consequences of his
or her actions" (citing W. PROSSER & W. P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, §§ 41-45 (5th
ed. 1984).
3" See infra notes 345-357 and accompanying text.
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icate acts of fraud directed to some entity other than the defen-
dant, many courts use proximate cause to severely restrict
recovery. 42
The typical RICO suit which alleges damage by reason of
fraud directed at some entity other than the plaintiff tends to
be a "true environmental" action.3 43 For example, a property
owner whose land is contaminated by an adjacent toxic waste
site may sue for damage to his property, and allege that the
toxic waste operator engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity
through numerous acts of mail or wire fraud in connection with
securing government permits. In this scenario, the fraud may be
viewed as "directed at" the government agencies responsible for
issuing the permits. The plaintiff may allege that but for the
fraudulently-acquired permit which allowed continued operation
of the facility, the facility would have been closed down or
cleaned up by the government. In 1987, one commentator sug-
gested that in such a scenario,
The plaintiff can meet the requirements of section 1964(c)
without ever seeing the defendant's fraudulent mailings to the
government. All that is necessary is that the corporation lull
the government into inaction with the result that the corpora-
tion is allowed to carelessly dispose of the leaking toxic waste.3
Clearly, some courts have not been quite so generous with
toxic waste/RICO plaintiffs. The Huntsman-Christensen court3 4
considered a RICO action against defendants which generated
and disposed of hazardous wastes. The plaintiffs, who subse-
quently leased a waste disposal site from the defendants, claimed
they were injured by reason of the defendants' alleged predicate
acts of mail fraud concerning the site. Frauds allegedly were
perpetrated upon the government and the plaintiffs. 34 The court,
"I2 See infra notes 345, 351 and accompanying text.
4,' In other words, the plaintiff's injuries are directly related to damage of environ-
mental resources in which the plaintiff possesses a property interest. See supra note 70
and accompanying text.
I" Note, The Applicability of Civil RICO to Toxic Waste Polluters, supra note 85,
at 478.
-,s Huntsman-Christensen Corp. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., slip op. at 21, No.
C86-530G (C.D. Utah, Nov. 24, 1986).
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants "engaged in a scheme to
defraud and deceive federal, state and local governmental regulatory agencies, the public,
their own employees, and Plaintiffs in particular into believing that ... [the defendants']
operations were conducted in a safe and lawful manner, and to conceal the massive
contamination ... on land adjacent to the ... sites." Id. at 22.
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however, denied recovery for frauds perpetuated upon the gov-
ernment.
The gravamen of Plaintiffs' RICO claims . . . appears to rest
in indirect injury resultant from alleged concealment and false
statements to government agencies. To the extent that Plain-
tiffs' complaint seeks recovery for injuries that were the indi-
rect and incidental consequence of the ... [defendants'] alleged
fraud on the government those claims are dismissed as not
proximate and outside the scope of RICO. To the extent that
Plaintiffs can prove at trial that their damages were the direct
and intended result of the Mountain Fuel Defendants' alleged
fraud on the government, they should be allowed to do so...
347
It is unclear from reading the Huntsman-Christensen opinion
exactly what the court would require to show that the damages
were the "direct and intended result" of acts of fraud directed
at the government. In a footnote, the court explained that "a
direct injury is suffered when the plaintiff intends such injury,
even if the fraudulent misrepresentation is made to a third
party.' '348 The court did not explicitly require specific intent, but
the strong language suggests that reckless disregard of the con-
sequences would be insufficient.
Opinions in other environmental/natural resources RICO
cases deal with the proximate cause issue in an even more cursory
fashion.149 Some courts confuse the issues of factual causation
and proximate causation. When reading cases purporting to deal
-,7 Id. at 30.
Id. at 30, n.18.
141 See, e.g., Standard Equipment, Inc. v. Boeing Co., No. C84-1129M, 16 Envt'l
L. Rep. 20246 (Envt'l L. Inst.) (W.D. Wash. Feb. 5, 1985). The plaintiff owned property
adjacent to one defendant's hazardous waste site, and alleged the waste migrated onto
the plaintiff's property. Furthermore, the plaintiff alleged that the site operators com-
mitted mail and wire fraud acts directed at "various agencies and the public" for the
purposes of illegally dumping toxic wastes and covering up the illegal dumping. Plaintiffs
also alleged that other defendants aided and abetted the scheme by sending waste to the
site when the mail and wire fraud acts were "reasonably forseeable." Id. at 20247.
The court's discussion of proximate cause was brief. Citing Haroco, 747 F.2d at
384, the court implied that "proximate cause" is satisfied when the "predicate criminal
conduct ... directly or indirectly .. . injure[s] the plaintiff's business or property." Id.
Standard Equip., 16 Envt'l L. Rep. at 20247. After making reference to the fact RICO
is broadly drafted and that "Congress deliberately cast the net of liability wide . . ."
the Court held that the plaintiffs adequately alleged their injuries were proximately
caused by the defendants' "fraudulent scheme to wrongfully dispose of waste at the
Western site." Id.
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with proximate cause, it is helpful to keep in mind that the real
issue might be cause in fact. 3 0 The inverse may also be true.
Opinions which deny recovery because injuries are "indirect"
may, in reality, be based upon one court's idea of what consti-
tutes proximate cause. 31' Adding to the confusion, some opinions
use the "direct/indirect" injury terms in reference to traditional
standing requirements,35 2 and some even use the terms in refer-
ence to the particular type of injury which is compensable under
RICO.353 Finally, some courts use the term "indirect" injury as
350 See, e.g., Gas Reclamation 663 F. Supp. at 1125-26, where the court claimed
that investors in gas reclamation units failed to adequately plead that their injuries were
"proximately caused" by an accounting firm's alleged fraud with respect to the trans-
mission of engagement letters. Immediately following the statement about "proximate
cause", the court said that the complaint "fails to plead satisfactorily either that . ..
[the accounting firm's] conduct induced the . . . investors to invest or caused them to
sustain a loss." Furthermore, the court noted that the plaintiffs (investors) merely
claimed that "the alleged transmissions occurred concurrently with their purchase of
Gas Reclamation Units . .. ."
If the plaintiffs really failed to provide a causal link between their losses and the
acts of fraud, it was a failure to plead factual causation. Defects in factual causation
may often be cured by amending the pleadings; each link in the chain of causation must
appear in the complaint. The plaintiff must present a syllogism to the court. Even if the
syllogism reaches its logical conclusion-a showing of factual causation-the court may
still deny, recovery because of a policy judgment denominated as "proximate cause."
See supra note 331 and accompanying text. Gas Reclamation confused the issues of
factual cause and proximate cause.
- See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Universal Mortgage Corp., 692 F. Supp. 992
(E.D. Wis. 1988)(injuries to municipality and neighborhood associations were too "in-
direct and remote" from scheme to fraudulently secure home mortgage insurance from
federal agency).
" See supra notes 324-325 and accompanying text.
"' See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497. In this context, the Supreme Court defined
"direct" injuries as those which flow from the predicate acts themselves, as opposed to
injuries flowing from the whole "pattern of racketeering activity." The latter type
became known as "racketeering injury." See infra notes 361-386 and accompanying
text. The Sedima dissent argued that only injuries flowing from the entire "pattern" are
recoverable. The majority rejected this view, and held that both types of injury are
compensable under RICO. In response to the dissent, though, the Court made reference
to the term "proximate cause":
Under the dissent's reading of the statute, the harm proximately caused by
the forbidden conduct is not compensable, but that ultimately and indirectly
flowing therefrom is. We reject this topsy-turvy approach, finding no
warrant in the language or the history of the statute for denying recovery
thereunder to the "direct victims of the [racketeering] activity . while
preserving it for the indirect.
Sedima, at 497, n.15.
The Court's reference to "proximate cause" at this point is confusing. The plaintiff
alleged the defendant committed acts of mail fraud by presenting inflated bills to the
plaintiff. Id. at 484. There was no allegation that the fraud was directed at a third
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shorthand for the absence of traditional (non-RICO) standing.31 4
The practitioner confronted with a proximate cause issue should
look beyond these often deceptive "buzzwords," and separate
the real issues for the court. One commentator asserted that in
the context of tort law, proximate cause has "no integrated
meaning of its own," 3"s and its "chameleon quality ... permits
it to be substituted for any one of the elements of a . .. case
when decision on that element becomes difficult .... ",356 This
commentator concluded that "No other formula .... so nearly
does the work of Aladdin's lamp. 3 57 The cases show that this
analysis applies equally to RICO causation.
e. Injury "By Reason Of" Under Sections 1962 (a), (b) and
(c)
A RICO plaintiff may recover for injuries "by reason of a
violation of § 1962."' 8 In Sedima,35 9 the United States Supreme
Court considered whether an injury was "by reason of" a vio-
lation of subsection 1962(c). Recall that this subsection makes it
unlawful for a person employed by or associated with an enter-
prise to conduct or participate in the enterprise's affairs through
a pattern of racketeering activity. a60 Before Sedima was decided,
many courts required proof that injury resulted from the very
fact of the defendant's participation in the enterprise.36' This
party. The plaintiff was clearly the intended victim. The question before the Court
concerned what type of injuries were compensable. From this author's analytical view-
point, the Court's discussion of "proximate cause" is irrelevant to the holding that
recoverable damages include those sustained from the predicate acts themselves-as
opposed to the more amorphous "racketeering injuries." At the very least, cases like
Sedima show that shorthand terms such as "indirect injury" and "proximate cause"
mean different things to different courts.
314 See supra notes 323-325 and accompanying text.
"I Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEx. L. REv. 471, 471
(1950).
356 Id.
-' Id. at 472.
"1 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (authorizes a suit by "any person injured in his business or
property").
" 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985).
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
1 See, e.g., Waste Recovery Corp. v. Mahler, 566 F. Supp. 1466 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
Here, the plaintiffs purchased a waste oil re-refining business from the defendants. The
plaintiffs subsequently discovered that the defendants had been conducting the business
through a pattern of racketeering activity, which included mail fraud and bribery of
public officials. Id. at 1467. As a result, the plaintiffs were allegedly unable to obtain
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came to be known as a "racketeering injury" or "competitive
injury. ' a62 An example of a "competitive injury" might include
a situation where an enterprise has been infiltrated by mobsters,
and "operates a legitimate business to a businessman's compet-
itive disadvantage because of the enterprise's strong economic
base derived from perpetration of predicate acts .... ,,363 The
Supreme Court held, however, that RICO damages "include,
but are not limited to ... [this] sort of competitive injury
.... t),4 In fact, "fa]ny recoverable damages occurring by rea-
son of a violation of § 1962(c) will flow from the commission
of the predicate acts." 316
The problem with the "racketeering injury" concept lay in
its vagueness; courts could not explain what it really meant.
366
In fact, one court borrowed Justice Stewart's pornography test
when it wrote, "I know [a civil RICO violation] when I see it,
and the [one alleged] in this case is not that.' ' 7 Recall that
Sedima was decided in the context of a section 1962(c) claim. Is
some sort of "racketeering injury" or its equivalent more clearly
required and more easily defined in the context of subsections
(a) and (b)? As the following cases demonstrate, some courts
have denied recovery under these subsections where Sedima would
have mandated the opposite result under a subsection (c) claim.
3
6
Subsection 1962(a) makes unlawful the act of investing in an
enterprise any income which is derived from a pattern of rack-
eteering activity.369 One author explained, "In other words, §
1962(c) makes illegal operating the enterprise; § 1962(a) makes
permits to operate the business. Id. at 1468. The court said that the injury was not "by
reason of" a violation of § 1962(c). Rather, it was "by reason of" the defendants'
fraudulent concealment of such conduct from the plaintiff. Id. at 1469. The court
justified this result by explaining that .'ordinary' business fraud was not the intended
object of civil RICO liability." Id. at n.l. According to this court, the pattern of
racketeering was not the "proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries." Id. However, the
validity of this ruling is doubtful, due to Sedima, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
1 Whether "racketeering injury" should be viewed as a standing requirement, an
aspect of proximate cause, or merely a limitation on damages is unclear. Cf. Sedima,
473 U.S. at n.12.
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 522. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at n.15.
16 Id. at 497.
Id. at 494.
367 Waste Recovery, 566 F. Supp. at 1468 (paraphrasing Justice Stewart's concur-
rence in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)).
" See infra notes 369-387 and accompanying text.
18 U.S.C. § 1%2(a) (the statute also reaches the proceeds of such income).
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illegal the investment of profits. 31 7 He then commented that
"one might inquire just how the plaintiff has been injured by
the act of investing the illegal profits." 3 7' The Southwest Marine
case372 provides a good answer to this question.
In Southwest Marine, the plaintiff was an unsuccessful bid-
der for a United States Navy contract. The defendant was the
successful bidder. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant com-
mitted numerous acts of mail and wire fraud by falsely repre-
senting to the Navy that it was in compliance with environmental
laws, regulations, and contract provisions concerning the dis-
posal of hazardous wastes. The plaintiff alleged that these acts
constituted a scheme to defraud the Navy and to "gain an unfair
competitive advantage over the other bidders for Navy con-
tracts. 3 a73 With little discussion, the court held that the plaintiff
had "standing to sue" and adequately stated a RICO claim. 74
Although the issue was not explicitly addressed by the court, it
is not difficult to see how the act of investment of profits in the
defendant's business would "competitively" injure the plaintiff.
The issue was explicitly addressed in the Long Island Lighting
case.3 75 Here, the plaintiff sued under all three substantive sub-
sections of RICO. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant (Gen-
eral Electric Company) committed numerous acts of mail fraud
through misrepresentations concerning a nuclear power plant
containment system. The Section 1962(a) claim alleged that Gen-
eral Electric "invested proceeds derived from a pattern of rack-
eteering activity in itself.' '376 The plaintiffs alleged injury by
reason of the investment, because the invested funds "enabled
GE to enhance its ability to market its pressure containment
system .. . to . . . [the plaintiffs] and that .. . [the plaintiffs
were] injured because of ... [the purchase]. 377 The court held
that the plaintiffs alleged sufficient "injury and proximate
cause. '378 In essence, the plaintiffs' sole allegation under their
70 Smith, supra note 75, at § 6.02[1][b].
37, Id.
s71 Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Triple A Machine Shop, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 805 (N.D.
Cal. 1989).
"7 Id. at 808.
314 Id.
171 Long Island Lighting, 712 F. Supp. at 292.
376 Id. at 296.




subsection (a) claim was that the defendants were better able to
sell them a defective system because they funded their sales force
with money derived from fraudulent activity! In terms of con-
ventional "proximate cause," the alleged causation appears very
attenuated. However, proximate cause should be considered as
a separate issue altogether. The language of the plaintiffs' com-
plaint fit neatly within the language of section 1962(a).
The plaintiffs in Gas Reclamation3 9 were less ingenious in
drafting their claim for relief under section 1962(a). 380 The court
first recognized that under subsection (c), Sedima allows com-
pensation for injury by reason of the predicate acts themselves.38 '
However, under subsection (a), the Gas Reclamation court held
that "it cannot be said that one who has suffered injury by
reason of the predicate acts of racketeering has thereby been
injured by the investment of the proceeds. "382
This presents the crux of the issue. Does subsection (a),
unlike subsection (c), impose some sort of "competitive injury"
requirement by virtue of its language? The Supreme Court has
yet to rule on this issue. Although Sedima relied partly on the
"plain words of the statute, ' 38 3 the Court placed great emphasis
on prior "broad" interpretations of RICO and Congress' "ex-
press admonition that RICO is to 'be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes.'''3s Although the Court offered
no discussion of subsections (a) or (b), there is no valid reason
why the Sedima rule should not apply in either situation. The
court repeatedly stressed that "the compensable injury necessar-
ily is the harm caused by predicate acts sufficiently related to
constitute a pattern, for the essence of the violation is the
commission of those acts in connection with the conduct of an
enterprise. "1385
Applying this logic to section 1962's other substantive sub-
sections, a plaintiff's compensable injury must be the harm
" Gas Reclamation, 659 F. Supp. at 493.
"0 in fact, the plaintiffs did not even "specifically identify the subsections of §
1962 on which the RICO cause of action is based .... " See id. at 511. The court sua
sponte held that subsection (c), rather than subsection (a), applied. Id. So holding, the
court explained why subsection (a) was inapplicable.
3" Sedima, 473 U.S. at 479.
Gas Reclamation, 659 F. Supp. at 511.
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caused by the predicate acts, where the essence of the violation
is the commission of those acts in connection with a) investing
profits from these acts, or b) acquiring control of an enterprise
by committing these acts. In further support of this position, it
is significant to note that Sedima would even allow recovery
under subsection (c) for "competitive injuries" -those seemingly
most fitted to the conduct described in subsection (a).31 To date,
this issue has not been argued at length. Some lower courts,
however, seem to assume that Sedima is limited to subsection
(c). 387
ii. Damages Recoverable
The immediately preceding subsection discussed, under the
rubrics of injury and causation, the acts for which a plaintiff
may recover damages. This subsection briefly discusses what type
of damages are recoverable. It assumes the plaintiff proves cau-
sation, and thus has standing to sue.
It is noteworthy that RICO only compensates a plaintiff for
injury to "his business or property. ' 388 This has been held to
exclude personal injury, 38 9 mental suffering,319 and punitive dam-
ages. 39' These limitations obviously have more impact on "true
environmental" cases than upon business transactions involving
natural resources. However, one commentator pointed out that
with toxic tort victims, a strong possibility exists that "the
property or business damage recovery will be substantial enough
to compensate for personal injury as well.' '392
IV. CONCLUSION
RICO is clearly a powerful tool in the hands of either a
public prosecutor or a private plaintiff. A prosecutor may utilize
RICO to extend sentences, increase fines, and force forfeiture
of property. In the hands of a private plaintiff, civil RICO plays
a dual role. First, by creating a private cause of action with
I Id. at n.15.
"7 See, e.g. the Gas Reclamation case, 659 F. Supp. at 493.
m 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
Cuzzupe v. Paparone Realty Co., 596 F. Supp. 988, 989-90 (D.N.J. 1984) (RICO
action filed by residents in vicinity of hazardous landfill).
3w Id.
" ' Southwest Marine, 720 F. Supp. at 810.
192 Note, supra note 301, at 489.
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quasi-criminal sanctions and connotations, it may serve societal
goals through private attorneys general. Second, if properly un-
derstood, RICO may give the plaintiff significant procedural and
substantive advantages which are absent in traditional environ-
mental/natural resources causes of action.
Courts have greatly expanded the availability of civil RICO
over the past several years. One court said, "Instead of being
used against mobsters and organized criminals, it [RICO] has
become a tool for everyday fraud cases brought against 're-
spected and legitimate enterprises.' 393 One must surely question,
though, whether any organization which commits the predicate
acts required by RICO should be called "respected and legiti-
mate."3 94 In fact, Congress has indicated that it is "impossible
to draw an effective statute which reaches most of the commer-
cial activities of organized crime, yet does not include offenses
commonly committed by persons outside organized crime as
well. " 3 95
Even if such a task were possible, the application of RICO
to toxic waste cases would still be appropriate. When Congress
passed environmental statutes such as RCRA and CERCLA, the
cost of disposing toxic wastes escalated drastically. 396 This cre-
ated a demand for inexpensive haulers and disposal sites. "Or-
ganized crime," which has long been associated with conventional
waste disposal, moved in to fill the gap.
39
1
However, the United States Supreme Court has consistently
rejected arguments favoring the imposition of an "organized
crime requirement" upon various elements of RICO. 398 The Court
has repeatedly stressed a "broad" interpretation of all of the
RICO elements it has considered to date.399 One element, how-
ever, remains virtually untouched by the Supreme Court: the
causation requirement. In Sedima, the Court considered RICO's
"by reason of" language only in the context of a section 1962(c)
action.4 This has allowed the lower courts to severely restrict
"I Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1984), revd,
473 U.S. 486 (1985).
3' Cf. Northwestern Bell, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. at 2905.
I9 /d. (quoting Sen. McClellan, 116 CONG. REc. 18940 (1970)).
'9 BLOCK AND ScARPIm, supra note 12, at 60-62.
"' Id. at 63-65. See also Note, supra note 301, at 491.
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the availability of private recovery under subsections (a) and
(b).40' Furthermore, the Court has yet to definitively rule on
whether something more than factual causation is required to
show injury "by reason of" a RICO violation. Nor has the
Court ruled on the exact parameters for a proximate cause
requirement, if one even exists.
All indications to date support the view that causation should
be given a broad construction by the courts. The Supreme Court
has liberally construed the "pattern" and "enterprise" concepts
in view of RICO's remedial and punitive purposes. In Sedima,
the Court pointed out that the Second Circuit's "racketeering
injury" concept "created exactly the problems Congress sought
to avoid" by "setting strict requirements on questions such as
'standing' and 'proximate cause."' Yet, many of the lower
courts are now doing what the Supreme Court said was unde-
sirable.
Strict notions of "proximate cause" may be appropriate in
the context of common-law tort actions. Where courts create a
cause of action, they must certainly possess the right to place
limitations on it. However, where Congress creates a broad cause
of action such as RICO, "rewriting it is a job for Congress, if
it is so inclined, and not for . . . [the courts]." 403
Alfred L. Buchanan
-1 This is so, despite the fact that a subsection (a) or (b) action may be preferable
to a plaintiff for other reasons.
41 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498-499.
Northwestern Bell, - U.S. - , 109 S.Ct. at 2905.
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